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FEAR ASSESSMENT: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND THE
PRICING OF FEAR AND ANXIETY
MATTHEW D. ADLER*

INTRODucrION

Death, illness, and injury are welfare-setbacks. So, too, is the fear
of death, illness, and injury., Yet at the level of regulatory practice, a
striking asymmetry between the physical and psychological constituents of welfare has emerged. Cost-benefit analysis by the EPA,
NHTSA, FDA, OSHA, and other environmental, health, and safety
agencies typically includes a quantitative "risk assessment," where
measures to reduce physical harm are under consideration. 2 The
deaths, illnesses, and injuries avoided by the various interventions
that the agency might undertake are enumerated and then, often,
priced in dollar terms. 3 But these agencies almost never engage in fear
assessment (to coin a term). They almost never enumerate and price
the distressing mental states, such as fear, anxiety, worry, panic, or
dread, that are causally connected to environmental, occupational,
and consumer hazards and would (or at least might) be reduced by
more stringent regulation.4 In this Article, I argue against the
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Many thanks to Jonathan
Baron, John Broome, David Driesen, Robert Hahn. Jason Johnston, Jack Knetsch, Seth
Kreimer, Ro Malik, Eric Posner, Paul Robinson, Connie Rosati, Chris Sanchirico, Paul Slovic,
Cass Sunstein, and to participants in a symposium at the Chicago-Kent College of Law and a
faculty workshop at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, for their comments.
1. See Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk
Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1321-40, 1375-85 (2003).
2. See Office of Management and Budget, Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations
Under Executive Order 12866 § III.A.4 (January 1, 1996), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
inforeg/riaguide.html (requiring that cost-benefit analyses of major rules include risk assessmcnts); Robert W. Hahn et al., Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failureof Agencies
to Comply with Executive Order 12,866, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 859, 868 (2000) (examining forty-eight major nontransfer rules issued between 1996 and 1999 and finding that 'Jof
those rules that listed benefits, approximately 70 percent described benefits in quantitative
terms, either as a range or a best estimate").
3. See Hahn et al., supra note 2, at 870 ("[I]n 83 percent of the rules for which agencies
identified safety benefits, the agency presented a monetized estimate of those benefits. In
contrast, agencies monetized benefits for only 54 percent of the rules that identified health
benefits.").
4. See infra text accompanying notes 16-21.
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asymmetry-fear assessment should be a component of cost-benefit
analysis ("CBA"), at least for an important subset of agency decisions-and I discuss at some length how best to measure fear and
related kinds of psychological distress on a monetary scale.
A contrasting pair of recent administrative rulemakings will
serve to illustrate the current and conceivable role of fear assessment
in CBA. In the arsenic rulemaking, the EPA compared various levels
of arsenic contamination in drinking water to the baseline level of5
fifty micrograms per liter, the legally acceptable level at the time.
Sophisticated risk assessment techniques were used to predict the
number of bladder and lung cancer cases, both fatal and nonfatal, that
would be avoided by reducing the arsenic level to twenty, ten, five, or
three micrograms per liter.6 Each fatal cancer avoided was valued at
7
$6.1 million, and each nonfatal cancer at $607,000. But the public's
"peace of mind" from drinking less contaminated water was not
quantified, let alone monetized 8 -- even though the anxiety-reduction
benefits here encompassed not merely the intrinsic benefit of being
less anxious, but the reduction of costly aversive behaviors triggered
9
by high perceived arsenic, such as drinking bottled water; even
though the public tends to be particularly fearful of toxic chemicals,
and arsenic (unlike many other compounds) is popularly known to be
a toxin;1" and even though a fear assessment might have better justified the ultimate decision that the EPA did reach, since the
monetized benefits of reduced cancer mortality and morbidity were
smaller than regulatory costs at every arsenic level lower than the fifty
micrograms per liter baseline.11
5. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to
Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976 (Jan. 22, 2001)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142).
6. Id. at 7008-09.
7. Id. at 7012.
8. See id. at 7012, 7021.
9. See ABT ASSOCIATES, ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER RULE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS,
EPA 815-R-00-026, at 5-35 (Dec. 2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/ars/
econ-analysis.pdf.
10. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2261-63 (2002).
11. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. at 7016. Cf. JASON K.
BURNETT & ROBERT W. HAHN, EPA'S ARSENIC RULE: THE BENEFITS OF THE STANDARD DO
NOT JUSTIFY THE COSTS (2001), available at http://aei.brookings.org/admin/pdffiles/

reg-analysis 01 02.pdf. Burnett and Hahn find that the costs of the arsenic rule outweigh the
benefits even when a "high estimate" of nonquantifiable benefits, equaling four times the mortality-reduction benefit, is included in the analysis. Id. at 5-11. However, Burnett and Hahn use
a relatively low monetary value for mortality-reduction ($1.1 million instead of the $6.1 million
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The FDA's medical gloves rulemaking stands in sharp contrast to
the EPA's arsenic decision.1 2 The FDA used CBA to determine
whether to reduce the acceptable defect rate of gloves, used by
doctors and nurses to examine patients, from the current baseline of 4
percent to a lower level of 2.5 percent. 3 These defect rates serve as
lot-specific regulatory triggers: if the proportion of defects in a sample
of gloves from a particular lot exceeds the acceptable level, no gloves
in the lot may be sold for medical use. The FDA calculated not
merely the reduction in the rate of blood-borne illnesses associated
with a lower defect level, but also the reduction in blood screening
tests ordered by medical personnel who experience defective gloves.
Specifically, the FDA determined that 0.6 cases of HIV, 0.6 cases of
hepatitis, and roughly 100,000 blood screening tests would be avoided
annually by lowering the defect rate to 2.5 percent. 4 The benefits of
lower HIV and hepatitis mortality and morbidity were then
monetized, but so too were the benefits of fewer screening testsincluding both the avoided direct costs of testing and the anxietyreduction benefit. The monetary value assigned to anxiety-reduction
was thirteen dollars per test-the cost of the anxiety state experienced by a medical worker sufficiently worried by a defective glove to
order a blood screen, an anxiety state that begins when the worker
perceives the defect and that ends (in most cases!) when she learns
the test results.
The FDA arrived at the thirteen dollar figure by measuring anxiety on a "QALY" scale, and then converting from QALYs to dollars.
QALYs, or quality-adjusted life years, are a widely used welfare scale
in health economics. The scale ranges from zero (for death) to one
(for a perfect health state). The FDA reasoned:
[Persons] who experience high levels of uncertainty due to the
possibility of contracting serious, threatening diseases experience
heightened levels of stress and anxiety until the results of the
assumed by the EPA), because they employ a relatively high discount rate (7 percent) to adjust
the mortality-reduction benefit for latency. Id. at 6.
12. See Medical Devices; Patient Examination and Surgeons' Gloves; Test Procedures and
Acceptance Criteria, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,404 (proposed Mar. 31, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pt. 800).
13. More specifically, the FDA's proposed rule lowers the acceptable defect rate for patient examination gloves to 2.5 percent, lowers the acceptable defect rate for surgeons' gloves to
1.5 percent, and makes certain other changes with respect to the regulation of glove quality. See
Medical Devices; Patient Examination and Surgeons' Gloves; Test Procedures and Acceptance
Criteria, 68 Fed. Reg. at 15,405.
14. See Medical Devices; Patient Examination and Surgeons' Gloves; Test Procedures and
Acceptance Criteria, 68 Fed. Reg. at 15,408-13 (cost-benefit analysis of proposed rule).
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testing screens are negative. According to one measurement scale
of well-being, reduced mental lucidity, depression, crying, lack of
concentration, or other signs of adverse psychological sequence
may detract as much as 8 percent from overall feelings of wellbeing .... Scaling of the relative stress caused by events shows that
concerns of personal health, by themselves, are likely, on average,
to contribute approximately one-sixth of the total weighting required to trigger a major stressful episode. Thus, FDA approximates that increased stress and anxiety concerning possible
exposure to pathogens may reduce overall sense of well-being and
result in a [QALY] loss of approximately 1.3 percent.
... FDA has calculated an assumed [monetary value] of $373,000
for a statistical QALY [i.e., each year of life at a QALY value of 1].
This figure implies that the probability of each day of quality
adjusted life has a social value of $1,022 ($373,000/365). If blood
test results are usually obtained within 24 hours, the resultant loss
of societal well-being for each 5test subject is valued at approximately $13 ($1,022 times 0.013).1
This is a remarkable piece of public deliberation. We might
worry about the agency's QALYs-to-dollars methodology for pricing
anxiety-an issue I will discuss below. But in any event the FDA
6
deserves much applause for its analytic originality.1 Quantitative fear
assessment, as exemplified by the gloves rulemaking, is extremely
rare in American practice. I examined all rulemakings in the AEI7
Brookings Joint Center database of major rules. The database comprises virtually all the "economically significant" rules issued by
federal executive agencies during the period 1996-1999, other than
transfer rules (those that simply redistribute wealth or income).1s
"Economically significant" rules are those for which agencies are
required, by Presidential order, to prepare a formal cost-benefit
19
analysis that is reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget.
There are forty-eight rulemakings in the database. In numerous cases
agencies quantified and monetized death, illness, and physical injury,
but in only a single instance-the FDA's mammography rulemak-

15. Medical Devices; Patient Examination and Surgeons' Gloves; Test Procedures and
Acceptance Criteria, 68 Fed. Reg. at 15,413.
16. Cf. Eric Thunberg & Leonard Shabman, Determinants of Landowner's Willingness to
Pay for Flood Hazard Reduction, 27 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 657, 657-58 (1991) (discussing
attempt by the Army Corps of Engineers to monetize the psychological trauma caused by flooding).
17. See Hahn et al., supra note 2 (examining rulemakings in this database so as to assess
agency compliance with the Presidential cost-benefit order).
18. See id. at 861-63 (describing criteria for including rulemakings in database); id. at 88185 (listing rulemakings).
19. Exec. Order No. 12,866,3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
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ing 2 -did an agency quantify or monetize fear, anxiety, or any other
welfare-reducing mental states. 21
Why is fear assessment so unusual? Part of the answer, surely, is
normative: fear is difficult to predict and value, and thus agencies are
often justified in resisting the measurement of fear. To put the point
in cost-benefit terms: fear assessment has high deliberation costs,
costs that are often not worth incurring, for example, if the population whose fears would be abated or inflamed by the agency decision
is relatively small, or if the agency decision is not likely to have a
causal influence on anxiety because the hazard being regulated is not
"dreaded" or socially salient. 2 But this normative answer is incomplete since, as the FDA's gloves rulemaking illustrates, there will be
instances in which (ex ante) fear assessment is justified: prediction and
valuation can be anticipated to be relatively tractable; mortality- and
morbidity-reduction benefits are not large enough, alone, to determine the agency's choice; the agency has reason, preanalytically, to
think that the options under consideration will have substantial psychological effects, as compared to baseline; and so on. Nor can the
answer be that fear, by contrast with death, illness, or injury, is too
intangible to be cognizable by risk regulators-consider the wide
range of intangible benefits that are now standardly recognized within
environmental economics, such as the enjoyment experienced by visitors to parks or other protected areas, the recreational benefits of

20. See Quality Mammography Standards, 62 Fed. Reg. 55,852, 55,962-63 (Oct. 28, 1997)
(final rule).
21. The forty-eight agency decisions in the AEI database were final rules or, in a few cases,
interim final rules. I examined the published Federal Register statements accompanying these
decisions, and did not examine earlier agency statements published when the rules were
proposed, or the regulatory impact analyses that agencies prepared for OMB review or other
agency cost-benefit analyses connected to the decisions, except insofar as these were excerpted
in the Federal Register. It is possible that agencies in some of these rulemakings priced fear in
the regulatory impact analyses but not the Federal Register statements. I saw no indication that
agencies did indeed engage in nonpublic fear-pricing, but have not attempted to rule out the
possibility. Still, the paucity of cases where agencies publicly quantify and monetize fear, by
contrast with the frequent public pricing of death, is striking. By my count, agencies explicitly
quantified and monetized death, illness, or injury in thirteen of the forty-eight FederalRegister
statements accompanying the final rulemakings, and quantified but did not monetize death,
illness, or injury in seven instances.
It might be argued that agency failure to quantify and monetize fear rests upon the
view that the monetized valuations of life (VOSLs) agencies employ already incorporate fear
costs. See infra Part 1i (discussing the possibility of the "bundled" valuation of fear and risk
through "tailored" VOSLs). But I found no indication that agencies are consciously using
VOSLs in this way.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 83-89.
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hunting and fishing,23 the improved visibility that accompanies better
air quality,24 smell- or noise-avoidance, 5 the "scenic" benefit of viewing a nice landscape, 26 and the sheer satisfaction of knowing that a
site, ecosystem, or species exists 27-nor that fear and anxiety are too
trivial, since real ongoing anxiety about a hazard can be a serious wel28
fare setback indeed.
Is it too fanciful to think that the explanation is, in part, historical-specifically, that a now-obscure Supreme Court decision from
the early 1980s partly explains the near-universal agency reluctance to
price fear? Most scholars of risk regulation are familiar with the Supreme Court's Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum
Institute29 decision, from 1980, which spurred the growth of risk assessment by demanding that OSHA quantify the riskiness of a workplace toxin before regulating it. A few years later, in Metropolitan
Edison v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 0 the Court rejected a claim
by a group of Harrisburg residents, living near the Three Mile Island
nuclear plant, that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was required
to file an environmental impact statement addressing the psychological effects of restarting the plant. The Court held that psychological
distress was not, without more, an environmental impact triggering
the statutory requirement (under the National Environmental Policy
Act ("NEPA")) for an impact statement. It evinced concern about
the deliberation costs in quantifying fear, and skepticism about the
ability of agencies to distinguish between genuine fear, on the one
hand, and mere political preferences, on the other.
If contentions of psychological health damage caused by risk were
cognizable under NEPA, agencies would.., be obliged to expend
23. See

A.

MYRICK

FREEMAN

III, THE MEASUREMENT

OF

ENVIRONMENTAL

AND

ed. 2003) (discussing valuation of recreational benefits
associated with natural resource systems, including fishing, hunting, boating, hiking, and
camping).
24. See, e.g., Raymond Kopp et al., Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 3 HUM.
RESOURCE VALUES 417-52 (2d

& ECOL. RISK ASSESSMENT 787,806-07(1997).

25. See, e.g., Eran 1. Feitelson et al., The Impact of Airport Noise on Willingness to Pay for
Residences, 1 TRANSP. RES. (PART D) 1 (1996).
26. See, e.g., B. R. Bamber & Gaby Khoury, Contingent Valuation of Landscape, 135 PROC.
INSTITUTION OF CIVIL ENGINEERS -TRANSP. 185 (1999).
27. See FREEMAN, supra note 23, at 137-59 (discussing nonuse values).
28. See Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025,
2030-41 (1999).
29. 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion); see also John D. Graham, The Risk Not
Reduced, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 382, 386 (1995) (describing Industrial Union as "Itlhe turning
point for quantitative risk assessment").
30. 460 U.S. 766, 779 (1983).
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considerable resources developing psychiatric expertise that is not
otherwise relevant to their congressionally assigned functions....
[Further,] [a]nyone who fears or dislikes a project may find himself
suffering from "anxiety, tension[,] fear [and] a sense of helpless31
ness."

Metropolitan Edison is, in effect, the negative counterpart to Industrial Union. Had Industrial Union been decided differently, risk
assessment would be less central to decisionmaking at OSHA and,
arguably, other federal agencies too. The whole discipline of risk assessment might not have developed nearly so rapidly. And, had Metropolitan Edison been decided differently, fear assessment would be
more than a gleam in this scholar's eye. Agencies would have been
required to characterize fear for NEPA purposes; that would have
pushed them to quantify fear, and the step from quantification to
monetization is not so large, given the "contingent valuation" techniques 32 now widely used to monetize the environmental intangibles
mentioned above.
Historical speculation stops here. The thrust of this Article is
normative. Metropolitan Edison may be rightly decided as a matter of
NEPA, but legal requirements that agencies engage in cost-benefit
analysis (statutory requirements or the generic Presidential order) are
a different matter. Part I of the Article argues that fear assessment
should be part of the practice of CBA by environmental, health, and
safety agencies, at least in a nontrivial set of cases. 3 3 The remainder of

31. ld. at 776-77.
32. See infra Part III.
33. 1 and others have suggested that agencies should include fear-reduction benefits in
cost-benefit analysis. See Adler, supra note 1, at 1395-1401; Eric A. Posner. Fear and the Regulatory Model of Counterterrorism, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 681, 687-88 (2002); Cass R.
Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL,
ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 223, 258 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001). Indeed, Thomas Schelling suggested as much almost forty years ago in his seminal work on monetizing death. T. C. Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in
PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 127, 145-46 (Samuel B. Chase, Jr. ed., 1968).
The current article builds on these suggestions, and on a very small theoretical and empirical
literature in economics that addresses how a money measure of fear should be constructed and
seeks to estimate fear's monetary (dis)value. See Mordechai Shechter, Incorporating Anxiety
Induced by Environmental Episodes in Life Valuation, in 2 APPLIED BEHAVIOURAL
ECONOMICS 529 (Shlomo Maital ed., 1988); M. Shechter & M. Zeidner, Anxiety: Towards a
Decision Theoretic Perspective, 43 BRIT. J. MATH. & STAT. PSYCH. 15 (1990); sources cited infra
notes 140, 150-51.
This Article's focus is CBA. On the related problem of quantifying fear, anxiety, and
other mental states for purposes of environmental impact assessment or "social impact assessment," see Hillary S. Egna, Psychological Distress as a Factorin Environmental Impact Assessment: Some Methods and Ideas for Quantifying this Intangible Intangible, 15 ENVTL. IMPACT
ASSESSMENT REV. 115 (1995); Kurt Finsterbusch, Psychological hnpact Theory and Social
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the Article explores the subtleties of pricing fear. Part 1I argues, with
some qualifications, for unbundled valuation. In other words, the cost
of fear and anxiety plausibly should be measured separately from the
cost of those physical events (death, injury, illness) that are the objects of fear and anxiety states. Two sorts of methodologies are generally used by cost-benefit analysts to ascribe costs and benefits:
revealed-preference studies and contingent-valuation studies. In Part
III, I suggest that the latter technique is best suited to measuring the
unbundled cost of fear and anxiety. The contingent-valuation technique is an interview technique: the respondent is asked whether he
or she would be willing to pay a certain sum of money for a benefit, or
willing to accept a certain sum in return for a welfare-setback.
Part IV discusses some foundational issues relevant to the design
of contingent-valuation studies for valuing fear. Who participates in
the study (fearful people, or rather calm people who can remember or
imagine being fearful)? What is being valued: feared events, or the
fear state itself? How should we untangle the intrinsic hedonic cost of
fear from its instrumental effects (for example, the way anxiety can
ruin relationships, hinder consumption, slow the growth of wealth, or
interfere with careers)? Part IV also considers the indirect, QALY-todollars technique for monetary valuation that health economists increasingly employ, and that the FDA used to price fear in the gloves
rulemaking. This technique is appropriate, I suggest, but only if the
QALY scale is truly a welfare scale. Money, within CBA, functions as
the universal metric for well-being. QALYs can function this way too,
but too often researchers conceptualize the QALY scale as a measure
of "health" rather than of well-being.
It is common for theorists of risk regulation to argue that agencies should be responsive to the "dread" of the citizenry. Lay and
expert judgments of risk differ; this difference arises because lay judgments of the riskiness of a hazard track not merely the aggregate
fatalities that are expected to result from the hazard, but the hazard's
familiarity, controllability, and, crucially, how "dreaded" it is; and a
democratic practice of risk regulation should hinge, in turn, on popular perceptions of riskiness.3 4 This is a familiar line of analysis; my
Impacts, I IMPACT ASSESSMENT BULL. 71 (1982); John Lounsbury et al., Psychosocial Assessment, in SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT METHODS 215 (Kurt Finsterbusch et al. eds., 1983).
34. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1144-60 (2002)
(describing and criticizing Paul Slovic's populist approach to risk regulation); K. S. SHRADERFRECHETTE,

RISK

AND

REFORMS 89-99 (1991).

RATIONALITY:

PHILOSOPHICAL

FOUNDATIONS

FOR

POPULIST
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argument is very different. The account presented here is technocratic, not democratic. Risk regulation should track social welfare, not
popular risk perceptions. CBA is a technocratic tool for maximizing
social welfare. Yet technocratic risk regulation need not focus narrowly on mortality and morbidity. It should focus (prima facie) on all
constituents of welfare, including fear and anxiety.
In effect, my view lies between the democrats' and the naive
technocrats'. Popularly perceived risk should not determine risk regulation; the anxiety and dread that flow from popular risk perceptions
is simply one welfare impact among the multitude of costs and benefits flowing from hazards; but neither should risk regulation reduce to
counting deaths or injuries, to a crude minimization of physical impacts or a simplistic balancing in which death- and injury-reduction
are the sole regulatory benefits that are seen to counterbalance compliance costs.
I.

DEFENDING FEAR ASSESSMENT

What is fear? Philosophers nowadays tend to analyze fear as a
package of belief, desire, physical arousal, and unpleasant affect. 5 P is
afraid if he (1) believes that he may be harmed and wants not to be
harmed (paradigmatically if he believes that some physical change to
his body, which he strongly disprefers, may occur); (2) experiences
physical arousal such as rapid heartbeat, perspiration, or upset stomach, as a result of the belief that harm may occur; and (3) also experiences an ineffable feeling or sensation of distress. Anxiety is,
intuitively, different from fear. The difference may be that anxiety is
targeted at a harm that the subject believes he lacks any ability to
flee; or that the object of anxiety is more "indefinite" than the object
of fear, in the sense that the anxious subject lacks a clear picture of
the possible harm or a clear understanding of its likelihood.36 Fear
and anxiety, in turn, are different from phobia. Fear and anxiety
35. See Wayne A. Davis, The Varieties of Fear,51 PHIL. STUD. 287 (1987). Philosophical
accounts similar to Davis's are cited in Adler, supra note 1, at 1377 n.229. The psychological
literature on fear and anxiety is large and heterogeneous. Its various subliteratures focus on one
or another component of full-blown fear (the cognitive, behavioral, affective, or somatic component), or on some combination of these. For summaries, see DAVID H. BARLOW, ANXIETY
AND ITS DISORDERS: THE NATURE AND TREATMENT OF ANXIETY AND PANIC (1988); Arne
Ohman, Fear and Anxiety as Emotional Phenomena: Clinical Phenomenology, Evolutionary
Perspectives, and Information-ProcessingMechanisms, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 511 (Michael Lewis & Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones eds., 2000).
36. See Ohman, supra note 35, at 512; lAIN WILKINSON, ANXIETY IN A RISK SOCIETY 18-

21 (2001).
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entail a full-fledged belief that harm might occur; by contrast, phobia
is a state of distress and arousal triggered by the mere thought of possible harm.3" I desire not to fall from the high building, but know that,
given the high guard-rail in front of me, I will not. Still, I am phobically aroused and upset.
In this Article, I argue that environmental, health, and safety
agencies should engage in fear assessment: they should quantify and
monetize the fear states that would result from regulatory choices.
The analysis carries over to anxiety; to phobia states (for example,
phobias concerning a nuclear plant that nearby residents believe to be
quite safe, but can't help thinking about in a fearful way); and to all
other structurally similar mental states, such as dread, worry, apprehension, panic, or terror, wherein the subject's cognition (thought or
belief) about the possibility of his being harmed is married with a
desire not to be harmed, with physical arousal, and with a sense of
distress. The terms "fear" and "anxiety" are used below to refer to
fear in the strict sense, to anxiety in the strict sense, and to phobia,
dread, apprehension, worry, terror, panic, and other such cognitive/conative/physiological/affective hybrids.38
What about other welfare-reducing mental states, such as sadness, depression, misery, demoralization, anomie, boredom, and
many others? For that matter, what about welfare-enhancing mental
states, like cheerfulness, happiness, serenity, excitement, and pleasure? 39 Shouldn't agencies generally engage in a broad practice of

37. This distinction between fear and phobia builds on a salient distinction within the
philosophical literature on fear-the distinction between belief and mere thought-and may not
track the way psychologists differentiate the two states. See John Deigh, Cognitivism in the
Theory of Emotions, 104 ETHICS 824, 835-42 (1994); John Morreall, Fear Without Belief, 90 J.
PHIL. 359 (1993); Kendall L. Walton, Fearing Fictions. 75 J. PHIL. 5, 6-10 (1978). The belief/thought distinction has welfare relevance; but since both phobia and fear are harmful compared to a calm baseline, and closely related if not identical mental states, I do not emphasize
the fear/phobia distinction in my analysis below. See Adler, supra note 1, at 1383-84.
38. 1 focus on fear rather than "stress," which is not a type of mental state but rather a
fuzzier category used to refer to the range of welfare effects, physiological as well as psychic,
and sometimes if not often positively rather than negatively valenced, that "stressful"demanding-events can have on persons. Anxiety is one psychic aspect of stress. On stress, see
generally FIONA JONES & JIM BRIGHT, STRESS: MYTH, THEORY AND RESEARCH (2001);
MEASURING STRESS: A GUIDE FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL SCIENTISTS (Sheldon Cohen et al.
eds., 1995).
39. See Arthur A. Stone, Measurement of Affective Response, in MEASURING STRESS: A
GUIDE FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL SCIENTISTS, supra note 38, at 148, 151-53 (categorizing a
wide range of specific affective states as combinations of two dimensions, "positive affectivity"
and "negative affcctivity").
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hedonic assessment, including but not limited to fear assessment? 40
This seems incorrect. As discussed at greater length below, the proper
scope of fear assessment (and, by extension, of hedonic assessment) is
limited by deliberation costs. And fear is sufficiently different from
other harmful (to say nothing of beneficial) mental states, both in its
causal linkage to agency choice and in its welfare impact, that in some
choice situations agencies will be justified in engaging in fear assessment but not a broader hedonic assessment. The causal difference has
to do with the cognitive component of fear states. Fear states partly
consist in thoughts or beliefs about risky things, including the serious
hazards regulated by environmental, health, and safety agencies.
Regulatory mitigation of these hazards will tend to have a more direct
causal effect on fear and anxiety-or at least a different kind of causal
effect-than on welfare-reducing states, such as sadness or listlessness, that are not essentially cognitive.4 1
Further, given the welfare difference between fear and other
mental states, in other situations agencies will be justified in conducting fear assessment as a component of hedonic assessment, i.e., in
using fear/anxiety, rather than some more generic grouping, as one
particular type of hedonic impact-with its own particular unit costthat agency choices might have. Finally, the cognitive component of
fear makes the pricing of fear states especially tricky. In short, fear
assessment should plausibly be a separable component of hedonic
assessment, and I therefore analyze it separately in this Article.
So much for the nature of fear. Why incorporate fear costs within
CBA?
Overall welfare is a morally important, if not conclusive, consideration bearing on governmental choice.42 CBA is in many cases the
optimal decision-procedure for a governmental official concerned to
40. See BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, HAPPINESS AND ECONOMICS: HOW THE
ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS AFFECT WELL-BEING 175-77 (2002).
41. Toxins could also cause fear and related mental states through a physiological rather
than cognitive mechanism, by producing physiological changes that in turn produce negative
affects and other components of fear. See Moshe Zeidner & Mordechai Shechter. Psychological
Responses to Air Pollution: Some Personality and Demographic Correlates, 8 J. ENVTL.
PSYCHOL. 191, 205 (1988). But see Evelyn Bromet et al., Psychosocial Correlates of Occupational Lead Exposure, in 6 ADVANCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 19, 28 (Allen H.
Lebovits et al. eds., 1986). Fear thus produced, like fear produced through risk perceptions or
other cognitions, is costly and thus (at least prima facie) should be included in fear assessment.
Conceivably, if prediction costs differ substantially for the two kinds of fear, CBA might justifiably incorporate one but not the other.
42. See Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theorv of Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 241,302-13 (2000); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, t09 YALE L.J. 165, 209-16 (1999).
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determine which of the choices open to her maximizes overall wellbeing.43 "Costs" and "benefits," for CBA purposes, are improvements
and setbacks with respect to welfare. So if fear/anxiety is a kind of
welfare setback, there is a prima facie case for including fear/anxiety
costs within the CBA analysis. And, clearly, fear/anxiety is a welfare
setback. The law has long recognized this in areas other than administrative practice: for example, in the ancient tort of assault; in the more
modern emotional-distress torts (epitomized by intentional fearinfliction, although unlike assault not limited to fear-infliction); and in
the compensability of fear as a component of pain and suffering damages. Although the nature of well-being remains contested-the long
scholarly debate about hedonic versus preferentialist versus objectivist accounts of welfare continues unabated-fear is a welfare-setback
on all of these accounts. 45 Fear, like pain, essentially involves an unpleasant feeling. So only the masochist could prefer to be anxious;
normal types typically prefer the opposite. And the best objectivist
accounts, such as Martha Nussbaum's, 46 recognize emotional and psychological well-being as one dimension of human welfare; they also
recognize other dimensions (such as friendship, professional accomplishment, or aesthetic experience) that fear or anxiety would tend to
interfere with.
I have recently come to the view that the relevant account of
human well-being, for CBA purposes, is an objectivist account-not a
preferentialist or hedonic account. CBA, again, implements overall
welfare. But overall welfare depends on the balance of objective
goods and bads. Except in the special case where one governmental
choice is Pareto-superior-a case rarely if ever encountered by regulatory agencies-individual preferences provide no basis for determining which choice maximizes aggregate welfare.4 7 And hedonic
views of welfare are just too narrow. Hedonism, for example, would
not recognize the forced inactivity of a person crippled by fear as a
grave intrinsic welfare loss additional to the hedonic cost of her fear.
Still, it is worth emphasizing that my prima facie case for
43. See Adler & Posner, supra note 42, at 225-43; Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner,
Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences are Distorted, in COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS, supra note 33, at 269, 272-80.
44. See Adler, supra note 1, at t380.
45. For a summary of these accounts and the philosophical debate about them, see id. at
1303-10.
46. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
CAPABILITIES APPROACH 34-110 (2000).

47. See Adler, supra note 42, at 289-96.
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governmental fear assessment holds good across all the standard welfare theories, not just objectivism.
This case holds good, I think, whether or not the fear takes the
form of classic fear or anxiety as opposed to phobia, and-in the case
of classic fear or anxiety-whether or not the belief component of the
fear is rational or irrational. Jim is irrationally certain that his chance
of dying on a bumpy airplane ride is one in one hundred, and is quite
distressed during the six hour ride. June rationally believes that the
chance of dying from a immunological disease, with which she has just
been diagnosed, is one in one hundred, and like Jim is quite distressed
for the six hours until she learns that the diagnosis was erroneous.
Both Jim and June suffer welfare losses, I suggest, on the objectivist
as well as hedonic and preferentialist views of welfare. Arguably,
June's loss is greater, since her distress is epistemically warranted
while Jim's is not. 41 Were fear assessment wonderfully refined, that
difference might be attended to by regulators. But a flat refusal to see
irrational fear as a welfare setback and thus a kind of cost that, prima
facie, should be incorporated in CBA, would be mistaken.
If fear is a welfare setback, why shouldn't agencies price it? What
would overcome the prima facie case just presented for including fear
costs in CBA? One worry concerns quantification:that the fear states
resulting from governmental choices cannot be characterized in numerical terms, and thus cannot be valued monetarily and incorporated in the overall calculus of costs and benefits. I agree that fear
must be quantified before it can be priced, but deny that quantification (as such) is a problem. At a minimum, individuals can be placed
in the complementary categories of fearful or unafraid, anxious or
not, and quantities such as fear-hours or anxiety-days (the aggregate
time during which individuals are in the negative psychological state)
can be measured. This is what the FDA did in the gloves rulemaking4 9 In fact, much more finely calibrated scales for measuring fear
and anxiety are standardly used by psychiatrists and experimental
psychologists, such as the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory,
the Hamilton Anxiety Rating scale, the Beck Anxiety Inventory, and
the Covi Anxiety Scale.5 0 These scales, administered by observers or
48. See Adler, supra note 1, at 1382-84.
49. See Medical Devices; Patient Examination and Surgeons' Gloves; Test Procedures and
Acceptance Criteria, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,404, 15,413 (Mar. 31, 2003).
50. See PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO EMPIRICALLY BASED MEASURES OF ANXIETY (Martin M. Antony et af. eds., 2001); Eric D. Peselow, Outcome Measurement in Anxiety Disorders,
in OUTCOME MEASUREMENT IN PSYCHIATRY: A CRITICAL REVIEW 191 (Waguih William
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by subjects themselves, assign numbers to fear states, depending on
some function of the observed or self-reported mix of somatic, affective, and cognitive states experienced by the fearful subject plus his
behaviors)'1 And the scales, or at least some of them, are seen by
scholars in the field to be reasonably "reliable" (in the sense of pro(in the sense of tracking the
ducing replicable results) and "valid"
s2
measure),
to
purport
states they
An external skeptic might object that fear/anxiety scales, perhaps
psychometric scales in general, cannot be valid, regardless of what the
psychologists and psychiatrists might believe. Ascribing numbers to
fear states is a meaningless exercise. But the objection is misconceived. Numbers measuring the subject's arousal are validated by the
physiological states constitutive of arousal: the heart rate, the amount
of perspiration, the breathing speed. Numbers measuring the subject's
desires (how intensely does he disprefer the physical impact that he
fears) and beliefs (to what degree does he believe that the impact will
occur) are validated, respectively, by his utilities and by his subjective
probabilities. For more than half a century, since the seminal work of
von Neumann, Morgenstern, and Savage, economists have accepted
53
that preference and belief can be measured on cardinal scales. Skepticism is perhaps most plausible with respect to the scaling of the affective component of fear.54 What does it mean to say that Sally's
degree of distress rates 8 on a 0-10 scale? I will bracket the question
of whether it is meaningful to speak of affective intensity apart from
welfare. At a minimum, subjects can be asked (in principle) to rate
affective states on a cardinal scale, with the top number representing
maximum well-being, and the bottom number minimum well-being,
using the standard gamble technique deriving (once more) from von
Neumann and Morgenstern and now popular within the QALY literature. 55 Health economists accept that the intensity of a headache,

IsHak et al. eds., 2002); M. Katherine Shear et al., Anxiety DisordersMeasures, in HANDBOOK

OF PSYCHIATRIC MEASURES 549 (Task Force for the Handbook of Psychiatric Measures ed.,

2000).
51. Among other things, the subject's performance on tests of attention, memory and task
completion may well be a useful measure of her anxiety. See Ben Searle et al., Cognition, Stress
and Anxiety, in STRESS: MYTH, THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra note 38, at 89,95-106.
52. See sources cited supra note 50 (discussing reliability and validity of anxiety scales).
53. See Matthew D. Adler, The Puzzle of "Ex Ante Efficiency": Does Rational Approvabilin' Have Moral Weight?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1257 n.2 (2003) (citing sources).
54. See Stone, supra note 39 (discussing measurement of affect).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 175-79.
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an angina attack, or bronchitis is cardinally measurable; 56 so, too, is
the intensity of fear and anxiety.
The quantification objection to fear assessment is belied by a
body of empirical work where standard anxiety scales, or similar instruments, are used to quantify anxiety and related psychological
states associated with various hazards. 57 For example, Zeidner and
Shechter used the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory and another self-report anxiety scale to measure the correlation of anxiety
with perceived and actual air pollution among residents of the Haifa
Bay Area, an industrial region of Israel.51 Gibbs used the Spielberger
scale to study anxiety in the populations near landfills found to contain hazardous toxics. 59 Dohrenwend and his co-authors used the
Demoralization Scale to quantify psychological distress resulting from
the Three Mile Island accident. 60 The Demoralization Scale, like the
Spielberger measure, is a self-report measure that asks about affects,
cognitions, and perceived somatic states; it seeks to track all forms of
distress, including but not limited to anxiety. Bachrach and Zautra
used surveys incorporating the Demoralization Scale to determine the
degree of distress among residents of Rainbow Valley, Arizona, site
of a proposed hazardous waste site.61 Markowitz and Gutterman used
the scale to measure distress in Staten Island, New York and LindenPerth Amboy, New Jersey, shortly after accidental releases of toxic
chemicals near those communities.6 2 Lebovits and his co-authors in56. See generally VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH (George
Tolley et al. eds., 1994).
57. A related body of work quantifies the traumatic effect of disasters. See, e.g., Bonnie L.
Green et al., Levels of Functional Impairment Following a Civilian Disaster: The Beverly Hills
Supper Club Fire, 51 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 573 (1983); Ronald W. Perry, Environmental Hazards and Psychopathology: Linking Natural Disasters with Mental Health, 7
ENVTL. MGMT. 543 (1983).
58. See Zeidner & Shechter, supra note 41; see also id. at 191-92 (discussing other studies
of the linkage between air pollution and anxiety or other negative mental states).
59. Margaret S. Gibbs, PsychologicalImpacts of Toxic Exposure in Third World Countries:
An Extrapolation,8 IMPACT ASSESSMENT BULL. 7, 9 (1990).
60. Bruce P. Dohrenwend. Psychological Implications of Nuclear Accidents: The Case of
Three Mile Island, 59 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 1060 (1983); Bruce P. Dohrenwend et al., Stress
in the Community: A Report to the President'sCommission on the Accident at Three Mile Island,
365 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 159 (1981).
61. Kenneth M. Bachrach & Alex J. Zautra, Assessing the Impact of Hazardous Waste
Facilities: Psychology, Politics, and Environmental Inpact Statements, in 6 ADVANCES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY; EXPOSURE TO HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PARAMETERS 71 (Allen H. Lebovits et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter ADVANCES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY].

62. Jeffrey S. Markowitz & Elane M. Gutterman, Predictorsof PsychologicalDistressin the
Communit Following Two Toxic Chemical Incidents, in 6 ADVANCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY. supra note 61, at 89.
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terviewed asbestos workers and controls to determine the correlation
between perceived health risk and psychopathology; psychopathology
was quantified with the Current and Past Psychopathology Scales, an
observer-rated scale that includes a subscale for depression and anxiety.6 3 Davidson and her co-authors compared stress among persons
living near Three Mile Island to controls by using three different
measures: a self-report measure of psychological stress, the Symptom
Checklist-90, which covers anxiety, fear, depression, and related
states; a behavioral measure of persistence and concentration, on the
theory that stress impairs both (subjects were asked to solve a puzzle
and complete a proofreading task); and a6 urine sample for elevated
levels of epinephrine and norepinephrine.
So much for quantification. A different objection concerns uncertaintv. A hazard will cause some distribution of fear states in the
population, and these states can (in principle) be measured on a
numerical scale like the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory.
But regulators will never be in a position to know what the true distribution is-or so the objection goes. Yet uncertainty is a pervasive
feature of regulatory choice. Risk assessors, for example, are always
uncertain about the number of deaths that would result from hazards. 65 Consider a carcinogenic toxin in a waste dump. There are a
wide range of possible exposure scenarios, by which the toxin is
spread to larger or smaller groups of persons in larger or smaller
63. Allen H. Lebovits et a]., The Case of Asbestos-Exposed Workers: A Psychological
Evaluation, in 6 ADVANCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 61, at 3.
64. Laura M. Davidson et al., Toxic Exposure and Chronic Stress at Three Mile Island, in 6
ADVANCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 61, at 35. Andrew Baum, a coauthor on this study, published several other similar quantitative studies of the psychological
effects of Three Mile Island. See Andrew Baum et al., Emotional, Behavioral,and Physiological
Effects of Chronic Stress at Three Mile Island, 51 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 565
(1983); Andrew Baum et al., Stress at Three Mile Island: Applying Social Psychology to Psychological Impact Analysis, in 3 APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ANNUAL 217 (1982). Further
scholarship in this vein includes the Dohrenwend studies mentioned supra, note 60; JOHN
SORENSEN ET AL., IMPACTS OF HAZARDOUS TECHNOLOGY: THE PSYCHO-SOCIAL EFFECTS OF
RESTARTING TMI-I (1987); the studies summarized in U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION,

WORKSHOP ON PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROPOSED

RESTART OF THREE MILE ISLAND, UNIT 1, 18-31 (1982); and studies cited in Markowitz &

Gutterman, supra note 62.
65. On the topic of uncertainty in risk assessment, see, e.g., ALISON C. CULLEN & H.
CHRISTOPHER FREY, PROBABILISTIC TECHNIOUES IN EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT: A HANDBOOK
M.
FOR DEALING WITH VARIABILITY AND UNCERTAINTY IN MODELS AND INPUTS (1999);

Granger Morgan, Uncertainty Analysis in Risk Assessment, 4 HUMAN & ECOL. RISK
ASSESSMENT 25 (1998); Elisabeth Pat6-Cornell, Risk and Uncertainty Analysis in Government
Safety Decisions, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 633 (2002); Pamela R. D. Williams & Dennis J. Paustenbach, Risk Characterization,in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 293, 336-45 (Dennis J. Paustenbach ed., 2002).
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quantities, depending both on the physics of the "fate and transport"
of the carcinogen away from the dump and the demographics of the
surrounding population. It is also highly uncertain, for a given population exposed to a given amount of the carcinogen, what the aggregate
number of resulting deaths will be; the mechanisms of cancer remain
unclear, and even taking as given one or another causal model of cancer, the degree of toxicity of a particular substance (in effect, a model
parameter) will not be known with certainty. None of this is a conceptual obstacle to CBA (bracketing deliberation costs, a point to which
I will return in a moment). For example, probabilities can be assigned
to each exposure scenario, and to each possible number of aggregate
premature deaths within each scenario, and can be combined using
probability theory to predict a mean number of deaths-then used as
an input for CBA.
Parallel techniques can be imagined for handling uncertainty
within fear assessment. Assume that the basic unit that agencies
properly employ for quantifying fear is the fear-day: a day during
which the individual is substantially more fearful or anxious than
population norms.66 This is just the kind of unit now regularly employed by agencies and health economists for cost-benefit analysis of
acute physical morbidities such as headaches, angina, congestion,
coughing, sneezing, nausea, or eye irritation. Monetary prices are
assigned to headache-days, angina-days, congestion-days, etc. 67 For a
given person (characterized by the fear assessor, in more or less detail, to include some if not all68 of the characteristics that might influence fearfulness, such as her personality makeup, her awareness of
the hazard being evaluated for regulation, her physical proximity to
the hazard, its social salience, etc.) and a given day and a given regulatory choice (either the baseline choice of inaction or some other
regulatory choice), the assessor can ascribe a probability that the
66. Agencies could perhaps use the fear-day unit to capture the instrumental as well as
intrinsic costs of fear, by ignoring the dependency of instrumental costs on subjects' nonhedonic
as well as hedonic characteristics, and assuming a simple, linear correlation between the number
of fear-days each subject experiences and fear's instrumental costs for him or her. However,
fear-days would more naturally be used to capture merely the intrinsic cost of fear. On the
intrinsictinstrumental distinction, see infra Part V.A.
67. See F. Reed Johnson et al., Valuing Morbidity: An Integration of the Willingness-to-Pay
and Health-Status Index Literatures, 16 J. HEALTH ECON. 641, 644-45, 650-51 (1997); George
Tolley et al., State-of-the-Art Health Values, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY: AN ECONOMIC
APPROACH, supra note 56, at 323, 329-36.
68. Deliberation costs would warrant agencies in undertaking a limited rather than more
complete description of the traits of the various persons whose anxiety levels could be affected
by agency choices. On deliberation costs, see infra text accompanying noies 83-89.
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person will be fearful on that day. From these probability ascriptions,
the agency can determine, for each regulatory choice and each person, the mean number of fear-days that the person might experience.
Summing across the population, the assessor can determine the mean
incremental number of total fear-days that might occur as a result of
each regulatory option, relative to baseline.
Standard monetary values for the value of avoiding a fear-dayanalogous to the standardized values for avoiding premature death
that agencies are beginning to employ,69 and the standardized mone7
tary values for avoiding morbidity that are also now emerging °-can
be calculated, using the contingent-valuation techniques I will discuss
below. These monetary values can be combined with the estimates of
total incremental fear-days to produce a total monetized fear cost or
benefit for each regulatory option, relative to baseline. For example,
if the standard value for avoiding a fear-day is $50, and the mean
number of total fear-days that might occur if some regulatory option
were chosen is 100,000 less than the mean baseline number of total
fear-days, the total value of fear-saving is $5 million ($50 multiplied
by 100,000).
The format for fear assessment just described is robust with respect to uncertainty, and seems quite plausible because it parallels
techniques currently employed by agencies for quantifying and pricing mortality and morbidity. Different formats can also be imagined:
for example, measuring fear in units more finely or coarsely calibrated than fear-days; allowing the cost of a fear-day to vary with the
subject's wealth, age, and other characteristics, rather than using a
standard value; or directly pricing the lotteries over fear states produced for each individual by each regulatory option rather than using
those lotteries to derive a mean number of fear-days and then pricing
those days. These, too, are robust with respect to uncertainty.
I have thus far rebutted the quantification and uncertainty objections to fear assessment. Skeptics might also worry about causality.
The quantifiability of fear is necessary but insufficient for fear assessment: the analyst needs to predict the fear states that will be
caused by hazards and abated by regulatory intervention. But what,
really, is the objection here? Causal models linking hazards and fear
states can surely be developed. These can be rough, informal, "folk"
69. See, e.g., Donald Kenkel, Using Estimates of the Value of a Statistical Life in Evaluating
Consumer Polic , Regulations, 26 J. CONSUMER POLICY 1 (2003) (surveying agency practice).
70. See sources cited supra note 67.
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models. The FDA in the gloves rulemaking relied, in effect, on a folk
model of fear-causality: it assumed, without formal modeling, that an
event sufficiently elevating an individual's perceived probability of
infection by blood-borne pathogens to prompt her to undergo testing
would cause a fear state in her, lasting until the time that infection
was ruled out. More formal models are also possible, no less here
than for other social and psychological phenomena. For example, in
their study of the psychological effects of the Three Mile Island accident, John Sorensen and his co-authors employed a multi-factorial
model that correlated an individual's fear with his or her distance
from the plant, socio-economic status, family size, trust in plant management, and other factors.71
To be sure, given the contested state of social and psychological
science, experts have not converged (and cannot be expected to converge any time soon) on a single, consensus model linking hazards
and fear states. Some of the literature on risk perception suggests that
perceived differences in the riskiness of hazards (and, by extension,
differences in resulting fear states) are produced by a rich, lay normative framework that focuses on generic features of hazards, such as
controllability, familiarity, and inequity of the resulting distribution of
fatalities.7 2 By contrast, other work emphasizes the role of various
biases or mistakes in producing popular perceptions. On this view,
citizens evaluate hazards (and, by extension, would tend to fear hazards) by engaging in an intuitive, but often quite inaccurate, costbenefit analysis.73 Yet a different strand in the scholarship sees fearcausation as a dynamic, social process, involving the "availability"
heuristic and informational or reputational "cascades" manipulated
4
by political entrepreneurs.7

71. See SORENSEN ET AL., supra note 64, at 95-121.
72. See generally PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000).
73. See generally HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK: WHY THE PUBLIC AND THE
EXPERTS DISAGREE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1996).
74. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999). Yet further models exist. For example, Mary Douglas and Aaron
Wildavsky's "cultural" theory asserts that different modes of risk perception-for example, a
tendency to fear economic collapse, or instead environmental damage-are associated with
different social groups. See MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN
ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982). For an
overview of current causal models of risk perception, see SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK (Sheldon

Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds., 1992); Nick F. Pidgeon & Jane Beattie, The Psychology of

Risk and Uncertaint', in HANDBOOK OF
MANAGEMENT 289 (Peter Calow ed., 1998).
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But the plurality of possible causal models of the hazard-fear
linkage simply represents one kind of uncertainty. Here, too, the
analogy to risk assessment is reasonably straightforward. Continuing
scientific uncertainty about cancer mechanisms has produced a plurality of formal models of carcinogenicity: specifically, a plurality of
types of "dose-response" curves that correlate an individual's incremental cancer risk with her degree of exposure to a carcinogen. The
possible dose-response models include the log-probit, logit, Weibull,
one-hit, multihit, and multistage models, to name only the most
common. 5 This plurality has not stopped risk assessment, since various decision-theoretic techniques for handling model uncertainty
(like other kinds of uncertainty) exist and can be incorporated within
CBA. A highly sophisticated technique is so-called Delphi analysis,
where experts in the field-in the case of fear assessment, sociologists
and psychologists who research hazard perception-are systematically polled to determine the range of plausible causal models and
then the subjective probabilities that each expert ascribes to each
model, with the probabilities averaged or otherwise integrated to
76
produce a probability distribution across the models. A cruder technique is to adopt the model that (the decisionmaker believes) is best
supported by the evidence. This was Sorensen's approach in his study
of Three Mile Island's psychological impacts, and has been the EPA's
approach to risk assessment. The EPA's current guidelines presumptively require that risk assessors employ the so-called "linearized mul77
tistage" model in drawing dose-response curves.
A different problem regarding causality in fear assessment concerns causal inertness. The worry here is not that models of fearcausation can't be constructed, or are uncertain, but rather that the
best model will predict fear states in the populace to be insensitive to
regulatory choice. Consider the Alar scare. After fear entrepreneurs
75. See VINCENT T. COVELLO & MILEY W. MERKHOFER, RISK ASSESSMENT METHODS:
APPROACHES FOR ASSESSING HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS 166 (1993).
COOKE, EXPERTS IN UNCERTAINTY: OPINION AND
76. See generally ROGER M.
SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY IN SCIENCE (1991). Studies that have employed Delphi analysis to

estimate carcinogen potency in the teeth of uncertainty about the shape of dose-response curves
and other kinds of causal uncertainty include John S. Evans et al., A DistributionalApproach to

CharacterizingLow-Dose Cancer Risk, 14 RISK ANALYSIS 25 (1994); John S. Evans et al., Use
of Probabilistic Expert Judgment in Uncertainty Analysis of Carcinogenic Potency, 20
REGULATORY TOXCIOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 15 (1994); William E. Fayerweather et al.,
Quantifying Uncertainty in a Risk Assessment Using Human Data, 19 RISK ANALYSIS 1077

(1999).
77. See Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,997-98 (Sept.
24, 1986).
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publicized the alleged cancer dangers of the apple pesticide Alar,
many consumers became fearful of apples.78 Consumers experienced
fear states that were targeted at apples: fear states bundling together
the consumer's desire not to get cancer, with the belief that an apple
or apple-containing product might result in cancer, plus attendant
distress and arousal. Still, a regulator faced with the choice of banning
Alar or leaving Alar on the market79 might believe that the total
number of fear-days would be unaffected by the choice. To be sure, if
Alar were withdrawn, consumers would experience fewer fear states
targeted at Alar. But this reduction would be roughly balanced (the
regulator might believe) by additional fear states targeted at other
products. The regulator might have two general grounds for believing
risk regulation (in some area) to be causally inert with respect to
overall fear. The first is the psychological thought that many people
are dispositionally anxious; they tend to find something or other to be
anxious about, and their overall level of anxiety remains pretty much
the same, with different objects rationalizing an ongoing anxiety
state.80 The second is the social thought that, given the constraints of
individual attention and intersubjective communication, only a few
hazards (such as Alar) can be socially salient at any one time, and
conversely that informational cascades manipulated by fear entrepreneurs,81 or other such mechanisms, will always cause the available
slots for socially salient hazards to be filled. If Alar is banned, it will
be genetically modified foods, or fatty foods, or some other "hazard
of the month" that will become the target of widespread fears.
The causal-inertness objection to fear assessment is a serious
one. Some empirical studies of the fear/anxiety effects of hazards have
concluded that the hazards examined had little effect on the aggregate amount of fear-although this is hardly a universal finding.82 In
any event, it is important to see that the causal-inertness objection to
78. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 74, at 698-701 (describing the Alar scare).
79. As it turned out, Alar was withdrawn from the U.S. market by its manufacturer. See id.
at 699.
80. See, e.g., EUGENE E. LEVrrr, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ANXIETY 16 (2d ed. 1980) (distinguishing between "state anxiety (momentary and situational) and trait anxiety (a personality
characteristic reflecting a high predisposition or proneness to experience state anxiety)").
81. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 74, at 685-88.
82. See Lebovits et al., supra note 63; see also Dohrenwend, Stress in the Community, supra
note 60, at 174 (finding that Three Mile Island accident produced substantial demoralization in
the community, which dissipated within two months of the accident). But see Gibbs, supra note
59, at 10 (finding that toxic exposures had longer-term psychological effects); Davidson et al.,
supra note 64, at 44 (finding that Three Mile Island accident had longer-term psychological
effects).
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fear assessment is essentially connected to the problem of deliberation costs. Assume that the deliberation costs of fear assessment are
zero. It is costless for analysts to produce probability distributions
across possible causal models of fear-production and, within each
model, probability distributions across model parameters and inputs.
The upshot is (say) a mean incremental number of fear-days that
would occur if a given regulatory option were chosen, as compared
with the baseline option of inaction. If the hazard being evaluated is
causally inert with respect to fear, then this mean number should be
roughly zero. But that estimate can emerge as the upshot of the fear
assessment. The fact that, prior to undertaking a full-blown fear assessment, the analyst expects that the assessment will demonstrate
overall fear to be unchanged by regulatory intervention, is no reason
not to undertake the assessment-if the analyst also expects that the
costs of performing the full-blown assessment are zero.
But of course expected deliberation costs, for any variant of policy analysis, are not zero. Thus the deliberation-costobjection to fear
assessment: the most potent of all the objections, I tend to think. This
objection subsumes various plausible claims about how the differences between physical and psychological harms justify their differential treatment within CBA. One such claim, as already mentioned, is
that risk regulation is causally inert with respect to psychological but
not physical harms. Another is that psychological harms, by contrast
with physical harms, are relatively minor welfare setbacks. The aggregate benefits of mitigating the fears produced by workplace toxins
are (perhaps) much less than the aggregate benefits of preventing the
deaths these toxins cause. This fact or, more precisely, the decisionmaker's preanalytic belief 3 that the fact is true, constitutes a reason
to truncate CBA-to focus on physical but not psychological harmsonly if the expected costs of CBA itself are nonzero. A third is that,
although regulators are uncertain both about the causal dependency
of mortality on regulatory choice, and about the causal dependency of
fear on regulatory choice, the latter uncertainty is deeper. There are
more possible causal models to consider in the latter case, say-and
thus greater deliberation costs involved in assigning probabilities to
the possible outcomes of regulation.

83. 1 say "preanalytic" because the threshold balancing of the expected benefits of undertaking full-blown CBA with respect to some category of welfare impact, as against the expected
deliberation costs of doing so, must be done in a rough and intuitive way to avoid incurring the
very deliberation costs whose justifiability is being evaluated.
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Deliberation costs mean that agencies should be selective in performing fear assessment, not that they should refrain entirely. Deliberation costs are a general problem for CBA4 (although it could well
be true that the ratio of deliberation costs to the benefits of full-blown
deliberation are larger for fear assessment and other novel variants of
CBA than for traditional policy analysis). Agencies currently employ
formal CBA to evaluate only a small fraction of the choices for which
CBA is statutorily permissible. The Presidential cost-benefit order
demands that agencies produce a full written cost-benefit analysis, for
OMB review, only in the case of agency rules (not other decisions)
and only where the rules are "economically significant," that is, have
annual costs exceeding $100 million.85 This substantial limitation in
the scope of the Presidential order is grounded in (or at least plausibly justified by) the deliberation costs of full-blown CBA, even sans
fear assessment.
Deliberation costs-specifically, the kind of deliberation costs
that present an objection to fear assessment or other novel types of
CBA-mderive from our bounded rationality.8 6 The problem is not that
CBA requires full information; I have emphasized that it does not.
The problem, rather, is that the very task of characterizing possible
outcomes, and assigning probabilities to them, is costly. Were our
conceptual and mathematical abilities unbounded, the task would be
costless. Bounded rationality, too, means that the meta-CBA I have
entered into here-specifying the conditions under which agencies
should perform various kinds of CBA-cannot be both fully rigorous
and cost-effective. With that as an excuse for a lack of rigor, let me
offer the following factors which plausibly should bear on an agency's
decision to undertake fear assessment. (Whether these factors, or
decision rules grounded on them, should be formalized in agency or
OMB guidelines is an issue I will not pursue.) (1) The balance of
nonpsychologicalcosts and benefits. If the physical benefits of hazard
mitigation, namely mortality- and morbidity-reduction, already justify
agency intervention, fear assessment is unnecessary. In effect, fear
assessment should be performed (if at all) as a sequel to traditional
CBA. For example, the EPA does not need to evaluate the fearavoidance benefits of cleaning up a waste dump if it has already
84. See Adler & Posner, supra note 42, at 217-18.
85. Exec. Order No. 12,866 §§ 3(f), 6(a)(3), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. §
601 (2000).
86. See generally HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (3 vols. 19821997).

CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 79:977

determined that the monetized value of the lives saved by the cleanup exceeds clean-up costs. (2) Population size. Is the population expected to be aware of the hazard, large or small? Ceteris paribus, a
larger population means more fear. (3) Populationfearfulness. Does
the affected population fall in some general category that tends not to
be fearful: workers that self-select into high-risk occupations, for example, as opposed to consumers or members of the general population exposed to pollution?" It would be reasonable for the EPA or
the Consumer Product Safety Commission to pursue fear assessment
more aggressively than the Mine Safety Administration or OSHA.
Alternatively, is the affected population so dispositionally fearful
(sufferers from a generalized anxiety condition, say) that the elimination of particular fear-targets, such as regulated hazards, is unlikely to
change the total amount of fear? (4) Dreaded hazards. Does the hazard fall in a general category that is especially dreaded? The wellknown empirical work undertaken by Paul Slovic and collaborators,
quantifying the extent to which the population perceives various hazards to be risky, 8 turns out to be potentially quite valuable for agencies-although surely not in the way that Slovic intended. Hazards
with high generic perceived risks, such as pesticides, nuclear power,
food additives, or industrial carcinogens, are more likely to be the
object of fear states (ceteris paribus) than hazards with lower generic
perceived risks, such as home power tools, bicycles, or sunbathing.
Agencies might use Slovic's diagrams, or similar work, to decide when
to undertake fear assessment. While it is silly for CBA analysts to
give less weight to the deaths caused by power tools than by industrial
carcinogens, it is not silly for analysts to recognize that power tools
cause less psychological distress than carcinogens, and thus to attempt
to quantify those fear states when carcinogens, not tools, are being
regulated. (5) Hazard salience. Is the particular hazard socially salient? Measures of public attention (for example, the amount of media
coverage) might be used as a partial trigger for fear assessment. Alar
is, generically, no more dreaded than any other pesticide. This particular pesticide became the especial object of widespread fears because of social dynamics. The very fact of public attention to Alar
might warrant the EPA in performing fear assessment only in the
Alar proceeding, rather than in pesticide decisions more generally.
87.

Cf W.

Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES

FOR RISK 42-47 (1992) (discussing heterogeneity in individual valuation of mortality risk).
88. See SLOVIC, supra note 72.
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(6) Causal inertness. Does the scholarly literature suggest that the
hazard being evaluated is causally inert with respect to fear? This
overlaps with the population-fearfulness factor, but is partly distinct,
since there might be categories of hazards (particular consumer products or product-constituents, say) that are causally inert with respect
to aggregate fear even in the general population.
Assume that the factors just described weigh in favor of fear assessment. Some regulatory option would eliminate or mitigate a hazard that is "dreaded" i la Slovic and salient to a sufficiently large
population, neither particularly fearful nor particularly fearless; the
regulator does not believe (preanalytically) that the hazard is causally
inert with respect to fear; and the morbidity- and mortality-reduction
benefits of the option are not alone enough to outweigh the costs,
relative to baseline. In such a case-where the expected benefits of
fear assessment are larger than expected deliberation costs-are there
cogent objections to the practice? One objection is that communication and education rather than hazard regulation may be the optimal
governmental technique, in many contexts, for reducing fear.89
Although the elimination or mitigation of a feared hazard might be
cost-benefit justified given fear-reduction benefits, relative to the
regulatory baseline of governmental inaction, perhaps the option of
providing truthful and reassuring information to the public is in turn
cost-benefit justified relative to the elimination/mitigation option,
given avoided compliance costs. But this objection is not really an
objection to fear assessment; rather, it shows that, where fear is at
issue, regulators should use CBA (including fear assessment) to
evaluate a wider array of policy alternatives than is traditional, including informational and educational as well as prescriptive options.
A different objection is that fear assessment is self-defeating in
the long run. If agencies incorporate fear-reduction benefits in CBA,
fear entrepreneurs will have an added incentive to make citizens fearful of the hazards that the entrepreneurs want eliminated.9 0 This
89. See Posner, supra note 33, at 689-95 (describing range of regulatory instruments for
reducing fear about terrorism); Sunstein, supra note 33, at 259 ("The appropriate linitiall response to social fear not based on evidence, and to related ripple effects, is education and reassurance rather than increased regulation.").
90. See Howard F. Chang, Risk Regulation, Public Concerns, and the Hormones Dispute:
Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself? (unpublished paper, on file with author) (suggesting that WTO's
risk assessment requirement is justifiable, notwithstanding social costs of popular fears unsupported by a risk assessment, in virtue of fear-creation incentive that special interests would have
absent the WTP requirement).
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objection would be quite serious, I think, if agency decisions were
insulated from legislative control, or if legislative decisions were
themselves driven by CBA. Imagine a technocratic world in which
both Congress and agencies conscientiously resist popular pressure
and use CBA to reach their choices; in such a world, shifting from
traditional CBA to a CBA that incorporates fear assessment could
well end up, perversely, causing a greater amount of fear. For now,
however, fear entrepreneurs have a large incentive to incite fear,
regardless of the details of agency CBA, since agency decisions can
always be reversed by legislators who are (predictably) sensitive to
popular fears. Consider that fear-mongering is already a familiar part
of the politics of environmental, health, and safety regulation even
though agencies, with a very few exceptions, do not currently quantify
and monetize fear. 91
Finally, consider the objection to fear assessment expressed by
the Supreme Court in the Three Mile Island case, Metropolitan Edison v. People Against Nuclear Energy.9 2 The Court was concerned not
only about the deliberation costs of quantifying fear, but also that
"[i]t would be extraordinarily difficult for agencies to differentiate
between 'genuine' claims of psychological health damage and claims
that are grounded solely in disagreement with a democratically
adopted policy."93 If the Court's objection is that psychometric instruments cannot distinguish between genuine fear of some hazard,
and mere opposition to the hazard, even where respondents are truthful, this is clearly untrue. Attitudinal as opposed to anxiety scales focus on quite different somatic, behavioral, affective, and cognitive
features of respondents. For example, William Freudenberg tested
the Court's claim in Metropolitan Edison by surveying persons residing near a nuclear facility under construction in Washington State.
The survey employed a scale of pro-nuclear attitudes (based on questions such as "Do you favor or oppose the construction of this nuclear
plant?") and a psychological distress scale (based on questions such as
"Do your hands tremble enough to bother you?"). Freudenberg
94
found that opposition to the plant was uncorrelated with distress.
91. See generally BARRY GLASSNER, THE CULTURE OF FEAR: WHY AMERICANS ARE
AFRAID OF THE WRONG THINGS (1999); FRANK FUREDI, CULTURE OF FEAR: RISK-TAKING
AND THE MORALITY OF LOW EXPECTATION (rev. ed. 2002).
92. 460 U.S. 766 (1983).
93. Id. at 778.
94. William R. Freudenburg & Timothy R. Jones, Attitudes and Stress in the Presence of
TechnologicalRisk: A Test of the Supreme Court Hypothesis, 69 SOC. FORCES 1143 (1991).
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If the Court's objection, instead, is that respondents who strongly
oppose or support regulation of some hazard will not be truthful in
answering questions about their anxiety, the Freudenberg study suggests that that claim too is overblown. In any event, self-report fear
surveys focused on the very hazard being evaluated for regulation
(where the respondents' incentive to lie about anxiety would be
strongest) are hardly the only tool for estimating the fear states that
would be caused by the hazard. 95 A different claim is that, where a
person's desire for the regulation of some hazard leads her to be
genuinely afraid of that hazard (and not merely to make untrue assertions about her anxiety), that fear should be discounted for CBA purposes. But why? The genuine fear of those who support regulation is
no less a welfare-setback than the fear of those who (for ideological
reasons) oppose it, or those who are indifferent.
II. BUNDLED OR UNBUNDLED VALUATION: SHOULD RISK AND
FEAR BE PRICED TOGETHER OR SEPARATELY?

In Part I, I presupposed that fear assessment and risk assessment
would be separate analytic undertakings. For a given hazard, an
agency engaged in CBA would predict and then monetize the premature deaths caused by the hazard. And it would, quite separately, predict and then monetize the fear/anxiety states caused by the hazard.
The discussion in Part I addressed possible concerns about the feasibility and cost-effectiveness (given deliberation costs) of the predictive component of fear assessment. But the proponent of
incorporating fear costs within CBA might object that this whole discussion was unnecessary. Fear and risk assessment can be bundled
together, it might be proposed. Deaths can be sorted into different
categories, which (inter alia) are differentially feared. Contingentvaluation or revealed-preference methods can be used to determine
individual willingness-to-pay to avoid a risk of death of each type.
This willingness-to-pay number should, in principle, incorporate individual willingness-to-pay to avoid the fear states associated with the
anticipation of each type of death. Based upon the average willingness-to-pay to avoid a small risk of the different types of death, we
can calculate a "value of statistical life" ("VOSL") for each type. For
example, if individuals are (on average) willing to pay $1,200 to avoid
95. For example, as already noted, fear and anxiety scales include observer- as well as
subject-administered scales. See sources cited supra note 50.
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a 1 in 10,000 risk of incurring fatal cancer, but only $800 to avoid a 1
in 10,000 risk of dying from a noncancerous disease, and $600 to avoid
a I in 10,000 risk of dying in a car crash, the VOSL for cancer would
be $1_2 million; for death from a noncancerous disease, $8 million; and
for a fatal car crash, $6 million. These "tailored" VOSLs (tailored to
different types of fatalities, including differentially feared fatalities)
could then be employed by CBA analysts to price fatalities, obviating
the need for a separate "fear assessment."
Why think that "tailored" VOSLs might incorporate a fear cost?
To see the idea here in a concrete way, imagine a population of
10,000 exposed to two separate hazards, the first some old bridge that
no one fears, the second a toxic dump that everyone fears. Each hazard will cause exactly one fatality in the population. Members of the
population are polled about their willingness-to-pay to remove each
hazard. If the individual is rational in the expected utility sense, then
96
she conceptualizes each hazard as a lottery over possible outcomes,
and determines willingness-to-pay by comparing this "Hazard Lottery" with the "No-Hazard Lottery" that results if the hazard is removed. In the case of the bridge, the Hazard Lottery differs from the
No-Hazard Lottery by imposing a greater risk of premature death on
the individual subject: outcomes in which the individual lives a full
lifespan are relatively less likely (by 1 in 10,000), and outcomes in
which she dies from disease or by accident are relatively more likely.
In the case of the toxic dump, the Hazard Lottery differs from the
No-Hazard Lottery in two ways: by imposing an incremental 1-in10,000 risk of premature death on the subject and by involving a very
high probability of fear states targeted at the dump, states that occur
with zero probability in the No-Hazard Lottery and that (let us assume) are not replaced in the No-Hazard Lottery by fear states with
other targets. Thus the members of the population exposed to the
dump and bridge would, quite rationally, be willing to pay more to
remedy the first: exposure to the dump means an incremental risk of
death plus the certainty of incremental fear, while exposure to the
bridge means only an incremental risk of death.
The idea of "tailored" VOSLs is not novel. In particular, the idea
of using "tailored" VOSLs to capture the special fear/anxiety associated with certain kinds of deaths is not novel. Ricky Revesz, in a
major article on the valuation of life in environmental law, argues that

96. See Adler, supra note 53, at 1257.
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the EPA should employ a separate VOSL for cancer deaths, one that
has been adjusted upwards from the VOSL revealed by wage-risk
studies (in effect, VOSL for industrial accidents) to reflect the fact
that cancer is especially "dreaded. '97 An important distinction, hereone that Revesz does not draw sufficiently clearly-is the distinction
between fearing cancer and fear as a component of cancer morbidity.98
Someone exposed to a 1-in-10,000 risk of incurring fatal cancer is, in
effect, handed a lottery ticket involving two kinds of fear states. First,
there is fear of cancer, that is, the distress and arousal triggered by the
substantial (perceived) risk that she might contract cancer-a fear
state she incurs, let us imagine, with probability 1. Second, there is the
fear of death that accompanies the pain, suffering, and other disease
components of cancer: a fear state she incurs with probability 1 in
10,000. I am agnostic about whether agencies should employ cancerspecific VOSLs to capture the fear that is part and parcel of cancer
itself. My main concern in this Article is with the widespread fear and
anxiety states caused by the mere risk of death, illness, and injury, not
with the less common (although surely not less intense) fear and
anxiety states that are experienced as one symptom of disease or injury. This first kind of fear-fear apart from actual disease or injuryshould not be valued through "tailored" VOSLs. For this kind of fear,
we do need a fear-assessment practice separate from risk assessment,
or so I shall now argue.
A.

Welfare Equivalents and WTP/WTA: The Foundationsof CBA

Should fear be valued separately from the risk of death, or
should the two be ascribed a single, "bundled" cost? To answer this
question (and related ones that will arise down the line) we need to
97. See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 972-73, 981-84 (1999). Revesz's suggestion
was considered and rejected by the EPA's Science Advisory Board, for lack of sufficient evidence about the size of the fear premium. See EPA Science Advisory Board, An SAB Report on
EPA's White Paper Valuing the Benefits of Fatal Cancer Risk Reduction 5-6 (July 27, 2000), at
http://www.epa.gov/sab/pdf/eeacf013.pdf.
98. Revesz begins his discussion of "dread" by noting that cancer mortalities, unlike industrial accidents, "often occur following a long and agonizing ordeal." Revesz, supra note 97, at
972. This statement suggests that, by the "dread" component of cancer, Revesz means the fear
that accompanies cancer itself. Yet Revesz goes on to say that an estimate of the value of a
cancer death calculated by adding a morbidity premium to the value of an instantaneous death
is "conservative" because "it does not account for the dread aspects of carcinogenic deaths." Id.
at 973. "Dread," here, seems to mean the anticipatory fear of cancer that (rationally or irrationally) inflates willingness-to-pay to avoid a risk of cancer beyond the amount implied by its
mortality and morbidity characteristics.
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discuss a very basic valuational problem within CBA: the difference
between willingness-to-pay/accept and the novel valuational construct
that I have elsewhere proposed and will rely upon in my analysis of
fear assessment, namely the "welfare equivalent."
Consider a governmental official faced with a choice between
various options. CBA aspires to measure the welfare effect of each
option on a dollar scale-one that will reflect, at least roughly, the
goodness of the option in light of overall welfare. How to do that?
The measurement approach proposed in the economics literature is
this: for each option, for each individual in the population, we can
calculate her willingness-to-pay or -accept ("WTP/WTA") for that
option, in dollars, relative to some baseline. Then the overall monetary number assigned to each option is the sum of the WTP/WTA
9
amounts for that option, aggregated across the population.
WTP/WTA is, crucially, understood in terms of the subject's
preferences. In the idealized case, where uncertainty has been removed and the subject knows for sure which outcomes the regulatory
options will lead to, the definition of WTP/WTA is straightforward.
Imagine that the baseline of regulatory inaction leads to outcome W,
and that a regulatory intervention leads to outcome W*. Then person
P's WTP/WTA for the intervention is the amount of money, subtracted from or added to his wealth in W*, such that-with his wealth
position in W* thus changed-he is indifferent between W and W*.
1°°
He neither prefers W to amended W*, nor amended W* to W. In
the more realistic case where the subject is uncertain about the upshots of regulatory choice, so that each option is (in effect) a lottery
over outcomes, the definition of WTP/WTA is more complicated but
still essentially invokes preferences. Consider the set of all possible
outcomes {Wi). The baseline option is a lottery L that assigns one particular array of probabilities, summing to one, to these possible outcomes. The other regulatory choice L* is a lottery that assigns a
different array of probabilities, also summing to one, to these possible
outcomes. Traditionally, economists define the subject's WTP/WTA
for L* as follows: the amount of money such that, subtracted from or
added to his wealth position in each of the outcomes in L*, he is indif10
ferent between the L* lottery (thus amended) and L. 1 WTP/WTA
99. See Adler & Posner, supra note 42, at 177-87.
100.

See ROBIN BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS 31-60, 195-234 (1984).

101. This amount is known as P's "option price" for the lottery L*. Although P's WTP/WTA
under uncertainty might be specified in other ways, I believe that the "option price" is the
correct approach on my view of CBA as a decision-procedure implementing overall well-being,

20041

FEAR ASSESSMENT

under uncertainty is the wealth change such that, were it to occur in
each and every possible outcome of a lottery being compared to a
baseline lottery, the subject would neither prefer the lottery to the
baseline lottery nor vice versa.
The sum of WTP/WTA, thus specified, functions as the analytic
foundation for CBA within the contemporary economics literature.
Applied economists recognize that agencies do not have boundless
deliberational resources, and often propose CBA techniques that are
simply approximations to the aggregate WTP/WTA construct t0 -for
example, ignoring risk aversion, or pricing welfare impacts with an
average WTP/WTA rather than one that is fully sensitive to the heterogeneity of individual preferences. But the sum-of-WTP/WTA is
the concept that underlies these approximating techniques.
My own view of CBA is quite different. As I have argued elsewhere, the proper foundation for CBA is not WTP/WTA, but rather
the construct of a welfare equivalent ("WE").103 CBA implements the
normative criterion of overall well-being. But well-being and preferences do not necessarily match. The relevant account of welfare,
where interpersonal comparisons come into play, is objectivist, not
preferentialist.104 Given two outcomes, the baseline outcome W and
another outcome W*, P's (objective) welfare equivalent is this: the
amount of money added to or subtracted from P's holdings in W*
such that W* (thus amended) is objectively as good for P's welfare as
W. Here is one example: if P is a sadist and W* is an outcome differentiated from W by the fact that P inflicts pain on someone else, then
P might have a large WTP for W*, but his welfare equivalent is zero.
Engaging in torture might satisfy P's preferences, but is not objectively better for his welfare. "Objective" welfare goods are those features of human lives that prompt convergence of idealized (not
actual) preferences.105 No one, under ideal conditions, would prefer
sadism. Thus sadism is not objectively better for the sadist.
WEs, like the traditional notion of WTP/WTA, can be extended
to the case of governmental choice under uncertainty. The "lottery"
and given the correct specification of overall-welfare maximization under uncertainty. This is
not a topic I can pursue here. On CBA under uncertainty, see, e.g., FREEMAN, supra note 23, at
209-57; Richard C. Ready, Environmental Valuation Under Uncertainty, in HANDBOOK OF
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMIcS 568 (Daniel W. Bromley ed., 1995).
102. See, e.g., BOADWAY & BRUCE, supra note 100, at 211-20.
103. See Adler & Posner, supra note 42, at 220-22; Adler & Posner. supra note 43, at 27280.
104. See Adler, supra note 42, at 289-302.
105. See id. at 298-99.
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notion remains useful. Where the choosing official and affected individuals are uncertain about the upshots of different governmental
choices, each option can be understood as a lottery across outcomes." 6 The baseline option maps onto lottery L, say; a different
option onto lottery L*. Then P's welfare equivalent, as between the
lotteries, is the amount of money added to or subtracted from each of
the outcomes in L*, such that L* (thus amended) is objectively just as
good for P as L. Convergent idealized observers would neither prefer
L to L*, nor vice versa.
The foundational construct for CBA, I suggest, is the sum of
WEs, not the sum of WTP/WTA. For it is the sum of WEs (as
weighted, perhaps, to compensate for the variable marginal utility of
money), not the sum of WTP/WTA, that maps onto overall objective
well-being. What does this mean, concretely, for agency practice?
CBA analysts should, at least in some cases, override a subject's
expressed or revealed WTP/WTA where the analyst believes that the
WTP/WTA is "distorted"-where it substantially deviates from (what
the analyst believes to be) the subject's welfare equivalent. To be
sure, individuals are in many cases the best judges of their own welfare. Further, given the incremental deliberation costs of determining
an individual's WE rather than his WTP/WTA, the apparent gap between the two welfare measures should be reasonably clear and substantial before the CBA analyst departs from the traditional
WTP/WTA measure. Still, there will be ample scope within optimal
administrative practice for such departures-for an agency to "second
guess" an individual's judgment about the impact of an agency choice
on his or her welfare, and specifically about the size of the monetary
payment needed to counterbalance that impact.
Indeed, as Eric Posner and I have demonstrated in prior work,
agencies undertaking CBA regularly correct for preference distor10 7
tions and depart from the traditional WTP/WTA measure. This can
happen in three basic ways. Consider once more an agency choice
between a baseline option, understood as a lottery L over possible
outcomes, and another choice, understood as a different lottery L*
over outcomes. The subject's WTP/WTA for L* might be distorted,
106. 1 am skeptical that the probabilities in this lottery are frequentist probabilities, and
tend to think that they are subjective probabilities measuring the official's beliefs. But this is not
an issue I can pursue here. See Adler, supra note 53, at 1276-79; Adler, supra note 1, at 1316-21;
Matthew D. Adler, Legal Transitions: Some Welfarist Remarks, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
5, 15-16 (2003).
107. Adler & Posner, supra note 43, at 280-89.
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relative to his or her true welfare equivalent, by virtue of (1) distorted
preferences with respect to the outcomes in the lotteries; (2) a distorted view of the lottery probabilities; or (3) a distorted mechanism
for combining outcome-values and probabilities to arrive at an overall
valuation of the lotteries. Agencies, in practice, correct for all three
types of distortions to WTP/WTA. For example, agencies decline to
count the satisfaction of sadistic preferences, racist, sexist, or homophobic preferences, preferences for drug use or other activities that
are widely seen to be valueless, or (in most cases) disinterested preferences, as "benefits" for CBA purposes.'08 These are all preferences
for features of outcomes that, as a matter of objective welfare goods,
make no difference to the subject's welfare.
Agencies also routinely correct for WTP/WTA amounts that are
distorted by the subject's mistakes (by the agency's lights) about outcome probabilities. 10 A standard technique for doing so is to recharacterize the agency's choices in a way that circumvents the probability
mistakes, and then to survey affected persons about their willingnessto-pay/accept for the recharacterized choices. For example, in a CBA
regarding visibility over the Grand Canyon, the EPA showed respondents photographs of the site with different degrees of visibility,
rather than merely telling them about concentrations of pollutants
(obviating respondents' mistakes about the correlation between a
given concentration and a given visibility)."10 In a CBA regarding labeling of meat and poultry products, the USDA relied on contingentvaluation studies focused on the health benefits that (USDA predicted) would result from label changes, rather than contingentvaluation interviews about the literal changes in label wording being
contemplated by the agency, since respondents might misunderstand
the complicated linkages between label information, behavior, and
health."'

10K See id. at 285-86,281-82.
109. Much empirical work has documented that probability mistakes -specifically, probability ascriptions that fail to conform to the probability calculus-are widespread. See generally
REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING (2001). Popular probability ascriptions
that do conform to the calculus, but fail to match the decisionmaking official's probability ascriptions (whether these are taken as beliefs about the real, underlying frequentist probabilities
that ought to drive the official's choices, or rather as the first-person subjective probabilities that
ought to drive his choices, see supra note 106), also potentially count as "mistakes" that might
warrant the official in correcting WTP/WTA amounts.
110. See Adler & Posner, supra note 43, at 283.
111. Id.
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More generally, the whole practice of risk assessment as an input
to CBA is an elaborate effort to correct the mistaken probabilities
that individuals who are exposed to hazards often ascribe to the possibility of death. Consider the arsenic rulemaking, where the EPA
evaluated the benefit of reducing arsenic in drinking water from a
baseline of fifty micrograms per liter, to twenty, ten, five, or three
micrograms, by performing a risk assessment-predicting the deaths
avoided by each regulatory option-and then monetizing those
avoided deaths, rather than by directly polling individuals for
WTPIWTA for reduced amounts of arsenic."ll That sort of direct polling would have obviated the need for an arsenic risk assessment,
but-given the wide divergence between lay and expert assessment of
the changes in fatality probabilities created by a given reduction in
toxins such as arsenic-would have produced distorted valuations of
the regulatory options being considered by the EPA.
What about the third and final way in which WTP/WTAs can be
distorted relative to welfare equivalents: by virtue of a distorted
mechanism for combining outcome-values and probabilities to arrive
at valuations of uncertain choices? To understand this distortion, we
need a view about how outcome-values and probabilities are properly
integrated. The answer should not be surprising, given the consequentialist roots of CBA and the criterion of overall welfare: outcomevalues and probabilities are properly combined in accordance with
expected utility theory."3 Given an agency baseline and some other
choice, mapping onto lotteries L and L*, subject P's welfare equivalent for L* is the amount of money, added to or subtracted from P's
wealth in every outcome in L*, such that idealized observers, valuing
the lotteries in conformity with the axioms of expected utility theory,
would neither prefer the amended L* to L, nor vice versa. There is
considerable evidence, for example in the famous empirical work of
11 4
Allais, and more recently of Tversky and Kahnemann, that laypersons deviate from the expected utility axioms. Agencies should

112. See Alan Randall & Warren Kriesel, Evaluating National Policy Proposals by Contingent Valuation, in ECONOMIC VALUATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: ISSUES, THEORY, AND
APPLICATIONS 153, 160 (Rebecca L. Johnson & Gary V. Johnson eds., 1990) (discussing the
design of a contingent-valuation survey to elicit citizen valuations of national environmental
policies, and positing that "citizens value programs in terms of delivered levels of services rather
than, for example, concentrations of particular chemicals").
113. See Adler, supra note 53, at 1257 n.2 (citing sources explicating and defending an expected-utility account of rationality).
114. This empirical work is surveyed in HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 109.
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correct for this source of distortion to WTP/WTA, as well as for the
others already discussed.
B.

Against Bundled Valuation

I have argued that the foundational construct for CBA is not
WTP/WTA, but rather the welfare-equivalent ("WE"). Agencies
should, and do in practice, correct individual valuations that rest on a
clear misunderstanding about the features of outcomes that are intrinsically beneficial or harmful for welfare; about the empirical linkages between agency choices and good or bad outcomes; or about the
correct way to value lotteries. This objectivist (and idiosyncratic!)
view of CBA has important implications for the pricing of fear. To
begin, it shows why proposals to measure fear and risk costs in a single bundle-both Revesz' proposal to use tailored VOSLs and other
bundled-valuation proposals-are generally problematic.
I will use the following stylized facts to illustrate my points. Some
feared carcinogen currently exists in some medium (food, water, air,
ground, etc.) at some baseline concentration. One million persons
(consumers, workers, citizens, etc.) are exposed to the toxin. An
agency is considering three regulatory options: inaction; the "moderate" option of issuing directives or taking other steps to reduce the
toxin to a lower level; and the "strict" option of issuing directives or
taking other steps to eliminate the toxin entirely. The moderate option prevents ten cancer deaths, relative to baseline. The strict option
prevents ten more, for a total of twenty, relative to baseline. The
monetized benefit of the moderate option is the sum of welfare
equivalents (WEs) for the move from baseline to a lower level of the
toxin, across the population. Similarly, the monetized benefit of the
strict option is the sum of WEs for the move from baseline to a zero
level of the toxin. For simplicity, assume that individuals are homogenous in their tastes, wealth levels, etc. so that for each individual in
the population the three regulatory options map onto the same lotteries: a baseline lottery L; a lottery L*, corresponding to the moderate
option, which differs from baseline in that the actual riskl 5 of cancer
115. The "actual" change in an individual's cancer risk produced by a regulatory option
might mean the change in the frequentist probability of the individual's getting cancer, or it
might instead mean the change in the subjective probability number that the agency official
making the choice ascribes to the possibility of the individual's getting cancer. This is a thorny
issue, which I have bracketed, see supra note 106. In the stylized case discussed in the text, I am
assuming that the actual change in risk equals the number of avoided deaths divided by the size
of the population exposed to the toxin: 10 divided by I million for the moderate option, 20
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is reduced by I in 100,000 and the individual will (or may) suffer
fewer days during which he fears cancer; and a lottery L**, corresponding to the strict option, which differs from baseline in that the
actual risk of cancer is reduced by 2 in 100,000 and the individual will
(or may) suffer fewer days in which he fears cancer.
What are the possible techniques for estimating the sum of WEs
that might obviate the need for a separate fear assessment? Because
of the simplifying assumption that individuals are homogenous, and
face the same lotteries L, U, and L**, estimating the sum of WEs in
this case reduces to estimating the unique WE amounts for L* and
L** relative to baseline L, and multiplying that amount by the population size.
First, contingent-valuation surveys focused on the literal legal
language of the regulatory options being considered by the agency, or
the changes in toxin level resulting from those options, might be undertaken. "6 Assume that the moderate and strict options are formulated as technology-based requirements. Then individuals might be
asked for their willingness-to-pay for those technological prescriptions, or for a lower or zero concentration of the toxin. If individuals
were excellent judges of the causal links between technology or
chemical concentrations and cancer deaths, so that their subjective
estimates of the deaths avoided by the regulatory options closely
tracked the actual numbers, and if other conditions held true, then
WTP numbers expressed in the sort of contingent-valuation survey
just described would be good evidence of individuals' welfare equivalents for the regulatory interventions, and would subsume both the
risk-reduction and fear-reduction benefits of those interventions. Not
only would fear assessment be unnecessary, but so too would risk
assessment. The problem, of course, is that perceived risk and actual

divided by 1 million for the strict option. If frequentist fatality probabilities are calculated in a
commonsensical way-such that the probability of P's dying from a toxin equals the frequency
with which all persons exposed to the toxin die as a result-and if the agency official develops
subjective probabilities that track the frequentist probabilities thus calculated, then the number
of avoided deaths divided by the population size will equal the "actual" change in risk on either
understanding of "actual" risk. To be sure, frequentist probabilities could be calculated in a
different way, and the agency official's subjective probabilities need not track the frequentist
probabilities. But all the points I make in the analysis below, criticizing various "bundled"
valuation techniques, would hold true even where the change in "actual" cancer risk for some
individual resulting from some regulatory option does not equal the avoided deaths divided by
the exposed population.
116. For a discussion of the contingent-valuation technique, see infra Part Ill.
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risk" 7 can differ, and often do. By "perceived risk" I mean the risk of
death as perceived by those exposed to the hazard. In the case at
hand, risk assessment leads the agency to predict that the moderate
option avoids ten deaths in an exposed population of one million and
the strict option ten more, and thus to ascribe an actual risk-reduction
of 1 in 100,000 to L* and an actual risk-reduction of 2 in 100,000 to
L**. But individuals exposed to the carcinogenic toxin might well
believe that the moderate and strict options involve much greater risk
reductions: I in 1,000 and 5 in 1,000, for the sake of argument. Thus
individual WTP amounts voiced in contingent-valuation studies focused on the literal legal language being considered by the agency, or
on the chemical concentration amounts that would result were that
language to be adopted, might diverge wildly from the individuals'
true WEs for the agency's choices and from the agency's estimates of
the individuals' true WEs. In our stylized case, the WE for the moderate option is the welfare equivalent for a 1 in 100,000 riskreduction, plus some additional amount for fear-reduction. If the
moderate option is perceived by affected individuals as involving instead a 1 in 1,000 risk-reduction, then stated WTP for that option (described literally or in chemical terms) would presumably be orders of
magnitude larger than the WE. Ditto for the strict option.
"Tailored" VOSLs, as proposed by Revesz, constitute a second
way that agencies might produce a bundled estimate of regulatory
benefits, including fear-reduction benefits, without engaging in fear
assessment. VOSLs are widely used in contemporary CBA practice to
value life saving. " ' Each death avoided is multiplied by a sum in the
vicinity of $6 million. The underlying theory is that, where small risks
are involved, WTP to avoid a risk is approximately a linear function
of the risk avoided. If WTP to avoid a 1-in-1 million risk is $6, a
117. An individual's perceived risk of some hazard is her own subjective probability of that
hazard. That can differ from the actual risk, whether defined as the frequentist probability or
instead as the agency official's subjective probability. See supra note 106. For evidence of the
divergence between actual and perceived risk in the area of environmental, health, and safety
regulation, see, e.g., Ted Gayer et al., Private Values of Risk Tradeoffs at Superfund Sites: Housing Market Evidence on Learning about Risk, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 439 (2000) (finding that
individuals' perceived probability of cancer from Superfund sites, and therewith their
WTP/WTA to avoid these sites, is changed by EPA's release of information from its remedial
investigation of the sites); Mary Riddel et al., Environmental Risk and Uncertainty:Insights from
Yucca Mountain, 43 J. REGIONAL Sci. 435 (2003) (finding that the perceived risk of an accident
during the transportation of high-level radioactive waste, among residents of Southern Nevada,
is generally much higher than the Department of Energy's risk estimate). See generally HASTIE
& DAWES, supra note 109 (discussing lay probability mistakes).
118. The literature on VOSLs is large. See Adler, supra note 1, at 1398 n.297 (citing
sources).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

I[Vol 79:977

1-in-100,000 risk is $60, and a 1-in-10,000 risk is $600, then the sum of
WTP for a measure that avoids, and is seen to avoid, a single death is
$6 million regardless of the size of the population at risk-assuming it
is large. CBA, as I have conceptualized it, involves welfare equivalents rather than WTP, but the theory of VOSLs plausibly carries
over to welfare equivalents. Indeed the approximate linearity of welfare equivalents as a function of risk-reduction (for small risks) is an
upshot of expected utility theory-the normative account of choice
that, I have suggested, helps define the concept of a welfare equivalent. Imagine that individuals, after thorough deliberation and with a
good understanding of probability theory, on average state that they
are willing to pay an incremental six dollars for each incremental 1-in1 million reduction in fatality risk. Then the sum of WEs associated
with the risk-reduction component of regulatory options-in our stylized case, the options of reducing the toxin or eliminating it entirelycan reasonably be estimated by predicting the deaths avoided by
those options and multiplying that number by $6 million.
Although straight VOSLs are a plausible way to capture the riskreduction benefits of regulatory choices, "tailored" VOSLs are not a
plausible way to capture the combined risk- and fear-reduction benefits of regulatory choices. Consider our stylized case. Revesz's proposal is that there exists a "tailored" VOSL for cancer death-a
number Y greater than $6 million-such that 10Y will reliably track
the sum of WEs for the moderate option and 20Y will reliably track
the sum of WEs for the strict option. But this proposal rests on two
premises, both deeply problematic.119 The first premise is that fear is a
linear function of perceived risk; the second, that perceived risk and
actual risk are the same. Much recent work in psychology undermines
the first premise. As Loewenstein and co-authors explain, in a review
article summarizing this work:
Changes in probability within some broad midrange of values have
little effect on anticipatory emotions perhaps because ...emotions
arise in large part as a reaction to mental images of a decision's
outcomes. Because such images are discrete and are not much
affected by probabilities, the emotions that arise from them are
119. As usual, Schelling was prescient:
A special difficulty of evaluating the anxiety and the [feared] event together is that
they probably do not occur in fixed proportions.... To be specific, there are good reasons for considering the worth of risk-reduction to be proportionate to the absolute
reduction of risk, for considering a reduction from 10 percent to 9 percent about
equivalent to a reduction from 5 percent to 4 percent. There is no reason for the anxiety to follow any such rational rule.
Schelling, supra note 33, at 151.
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likewise insensitive to variations in probability. One's mental image
of what it would be like to win the state lottery, for example, is
likely to be about the same, whether there is a I in 10,000,000
chance of winning or a 1 in 10,000 chance of winning.... This is not
to say that fear responses are completely unaffected by probabilities, but they are largely unaffected by orders-of-magnitude differences at the extreme (e.g., between a 1 in 100,000,000 chance of
winning the lottery and a 1 in 100,000 chance).120
In short, "feelings of fear or worry in the face of decisions under
risk or uncertainty have an all-or-none characteristic; they may be
sensitive to the possibility rather than the probability of negative consequences. '"121 In particular, the intensity of an individual's distress
about a toxin might be largely a function of the knowledge that she is
exposed to the toxin, and not solely a function (let alone a linear function) of her perceived probability that the toxin will cause her death.
The agency's strict option, which eliminates the toxin entirely, might
well produce a fear-reduction benefit (fear-days avoided) many times
the fear-reduction benefit produced by the moderate option-even
though the death-reduction benefit (twenty deaths) is just twice the
death-reduction benefit of the moderate option (ten deaths). If so, the
sum-of-WEs for the strict option should be more than double the
sum-of-WEs for the moderate option-perhaps quite substantially so.
But whatever the particular number Y that might be used as the "tailored" VOSL for cancer hazards, the methodology will necessarily
estimate the monetized benefit of the strict option (20Y) to be exactly
double the monetized benefit of the moderate option (10Y). More
generally, "tailored" VOSLs assume that the ratio of the fear-days
avoided by different regulatory options exactly equals the ratio of the
deaths avoided by those options-and that is a highly problematic
assumption, given the psychology literature just cited.
Even if fear is a linear function of perceived risk, the "tailored"
VOSL approach runs afoul of the possible divergence between actual
and perceived risk. 22 To see this, imagine that in our stylized case the
perceived risk-reduction generated by the moderate option is 1 in
1,000 (rather than I in 100,000), and the perceived risk-reduction generated by the strict option is 5 in 1,000 (rather than 2 in 100,000). On
120. George Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 276 (2001)
(citations omitted).
121. Id.
122. See Markowitz & Gutterman, supra note 62, at 102 (finding perceived threat to physical
health to be significant in predicting demoralization); Zeidner & Shechter, supra note 41, at
199-200 (finding that perceived air pollution better correlates with anxiety and anger about air
pollution than actual air pollution).
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On the (implausible!) assumption that experienced fear-days correlate linearly with perceived risk, the amounts that well-reasoning individuals express in interviews inquiring about willingness-to-pay to
avoid small cancer risks should be approximately a linear function of
those risks. For example, individuals might express a willingness to
pay $12 to avoid a 1-in-1 million cancer risk, $120 to avoid a 1-in100,000 cancer risk, and so on, generating a "tailored" VOSL for cancer of $12 million. But $120 would then be the individual welfare
equivalent for the combined risk- and fear-reduction benefit of an
option that (1) reduces the individual's actual risk of death by 1 in
100,000; and (2) reduces the individual's perceived risk of death by 1
in 100,000, and therewith his fear-days by some amount equaling a
constant K multiplied by 1 in 100,0000. $120 would not be the individual welfare equivalent for the moderate option in our stylized case,
namely an option that (1) reduces the individual's actual risk of death
by I in 100,000 and (2) reduces the individual's perceived risk of
death by 1 in 1,000, and therewith his fear-days by an amount equaling constant K multiplied by that reduction in perceived risk. Rather,
his welfare equivalent for the moderate option would be larger than
$120-since the fear-days avoided by the moderate option are the
constant K multiplied by 1 in 1,000 (the perceived risk-reduction)
rather than I in 100,000 (the actual risk-reduction). Nor, finally, can it
be assumed that the ratio between actual and perceived risk is approximately constant across regulatory choice situations, with this
assumption somehow used to salvage the "tailored" VOSL method.
Consider the stylized case. The strict option achieves a reduction in
actual risk of 2 in 100,000, the moderate option a reduction in actual
risk of I in 100,000. What is to prevent the perceived reductions in
risk from having a ratio other than 2 to 1: for example, 5 to 1, as I
have posited?
Yet a third "bundled" valuation idea, different from the notion
of asking individuals directly about regulatory proposals, or using
"tailored" VOSLS, is this: for each regulatory option, conduct a contingent-valuation interview where respondents are told about the
fear-relevant features of the option, plus the actual risk-reduction
achieved by the option, and WTP/WTA is elicited for the option thus
described. In the stylized case, that would mean estimating WE for
the moderate option by asking about willingness-to-pay for the reduced concentration of the toxin achieved by the moderate option,
and informing respondents that the risk-reduction resulting from the
lower concentration is 1 in 100,000. Similarly, WE for the strict option
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would be estimated by asking about willingness-to-pay for eliminating
the toxin, and informing respondents that the risk reduction resulting
from elimination is 2 in 100,000. The idea here is that the riskreduction component of stated willingness-to-pay should track the
actual risk, not the perceived risk (thus the effort to inform respondents about the actual risk), and that the fear-reduction component
should reflect whatever respondents are scared of, not necessarily the
perceived risk (thus the description of the fear-relevant features of
regulatory options and the separate interview for each option, with no
constraint that the ratio of the fear-reduction benefits of different
options should be equal to the ratio of their death-reduction benefits).
Although this "third" bundled approach is an improvement on
the first two, it is still problematic. The largest problem is this: there is
substantial evidence that fear and anxiety skew decisionmaking under
uncertainty -specifically, that individuals in a fearful or anxious state
are much less sensitive to probabilities than expected utility axioms
would require them to be, even more so than ordinary decisionmakers in a calm state. 12 3 For example, Rottenstreich and Hsee compared
the differential WTPs to avoid small (1 percent) and large (99 percent) probabilities of a feared outcome (an electric shock), to the differential WTPs to avoid the very same probabilities of an averse but
pallid outcome (losing some money). 2 4 They found that a 99-fold
change in probability produced only a 1.5 fold change in WTP for the
feared outcome, and an 18-fold change in WTP for the pallid outcome. Specifically, subjects were willing to pay seven dollars to avoid
a 1 percent chance of being shocked, and ten dollars to avoid a 99
percent chance of being shocked! Similarly, Sunstein found that differential WTP to avoid a 1-in-1 million versus 1-in-100,000 risk of
death described in a gruesome manner (so as to make the subjects
anxious) was substantially smaller than differential WTP to avoid the
same risk of death described less graphically. 25 These experiments
demonstrate what Sunstein calls "probability neglect": choices by
emotional decisionmakers are driven by their emotions, not the probabilities. For CBA purposes, this means the following: WTP/WTA
amounts for lotteries expressed by anxious or fearful individuals are
123. See generally Loewenstein et al., supra note 120; Cass R. Sunstein, ProbabilityNeglect
Emotions, Worst Cases,and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61 (2002).
124. Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsce, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On
the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCH. SCi. 185 (2001).
125. See Sunstein, supra note 123, at 77-78.
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likely to deviate dramatically from their true welfare equivalents,
given the dramatic departures from expected utility maximization
caused by fear and anxiety.
The problem of "probability neglect" connects to a very deep
point about the proper role of fear in cost-benefit analysis. Fear is a
welfare-reducing feature of outcomes, one that should count as a cost
along with other, negative features such as death, pain, or bodily
harm. If a regulatory choice reduces the fear that certain individuals
would otherwise experience, then (ceteris paribus) the welfare equivalents of those individuals for that choice is positive. But to say that
fear is a bad feature of outcomes is not to say that estimates of welfare equivalents for regulatory choices, and for the lotteries over outcomes produced by regulatory choices, should be derived from the
expressed or revealed preferences of fearful evaluators. Rather, the
relevant expressed or revealed preferences are those of individuals
likeliest to be sensitive to the balance of objective welfare goodsindividuals likeliest to generate WTP/WTA amounts that are close to
the true welfare equivalents. Where risk-reduction is involved, this
means (inter alia) that the individuals should be processing the risks
in accordance with expected utility theory, at least roughly. And the
literature on "probability neglect" suggests that fearful individuals do
not do that.
"Probability neglect" thus undermines the third "bundled"
valuation technique I am now considering, and more generally suggests that CBA estimates of the value of risk-reduction should be
based on the expressed or revealed preferences of calm, not fearful
individuals. Mentioning the fear-relevant features of regulatory
choices to interview respondents (in our stylized case, the fact that the
baseline and moderate options involve some exposure to a dreaded
toxin, and that the strict option reduces exposure to zero) might well
have the effect of scaring those respondents, and thus skewing their
willingness-to-pay for the risk-reduction component of various
options.
Probability neglect is not the only difficulty, here. Let me briefly
mention some additional limitations of this third technique: (1)
"Stigma" and distorted outcome-preferences. Some diseases, such as
cancer, may be stigmatized, in the sense that individuals disprefer
having the disease to having a nonstigmatized disease identical in its
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mortality and morbidity characteristics.116 An individual with this intrinsic preference against the stigmatized disease would express a
higher willingness-to-pay to avoid a given risk of the disease, as
against the same risk of a nonstigmatized disease that is equally fatal,
painful, distressing, and disruptive of work and social interaction,
even if the individual conforms to expected utility theory, and even
bracketing the reduction of anticipatory fear. This is a distortion,
since the objective welfare impact of a disease for some diseased person reduces to its physical, psychic, emotional, occupational, and
affiliational impacts on her; the fact that the disease falls in some especially stigmatized category does not make it more harmful, except
insofar as individuals with stigmatized diseases are, say, more isolated, or upset. The third "bundled" technique cannot avoid the
"stigma" distortion: where a regulatory intervention reduces the risk
of a stigmatized disease, telling interview respondents the name of the
disease ("cancer," in our stylized case) would trigger the distortion,
while failing to tell them would underestimate the fear-reduction
benefit (since stigmatized diseases, plausibly, produce more anticipatory fear than non-stigmatized diseases). (2) Fear and perceived risk.
Fear is not just a function of perceived risk, but perceived risk may
not be completely irrelevant.127 Assume it is not. If so, and if perceived and actual risk diverge, a contingent-valuation format where
respondents are asked for their WTP for the actual risk-reduction
secured by regulatory intervention with respect to some hazard,
which is described to them in light of its fear-relevant characteristics
(other than the perceived risk), produces a skewed estimate of the
welfare equivalent for intervention. In our stylized case, the WE for
the moderate option would be estimated by asking respondents to
value a 1-in-100,000 reduction in risk resulting from a lower toxin
level; and the WE for the strict option would be estimated by asking
respondents to value a 2-in-100,000 reduction in risk resulting from
the elimination of the toxin. But individuals in the population
126. Berman and Wandersman, in their review of the empirical scholarship on cancer fear,
find that "[c]ancer is feared in the general population more than other serious medical conditions" and suggest (as I read the review) that this difference is partly but not wholly grounded in
the objective differences between cancer and these other conditions. Steven H. Berman &
Abraham Wandersman, Fear of Cancer and Knowledge of Cancer: A Review and Proposed
Relevance to Hazardous Waste Sites, 31 SOC. SCi. MED. 81,87 (1990).
127. See Loewenstein et al., supra note 120, at 276, 277 (declining to assert that "fear responses are completely unaffected by probabilities" and suggesting that "[tJhe probability
weighting function is flatter.., for vivid outcomes that evoke emotions than for pallid outcones").
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generally perceive the moderate option to involve a much larger reduction in risk (1 in t,000), and ditto for the strict option (5 in 1,000).
Thus, responses to the interview questions just described would underestimate the WEs of the options. Ceterisparibus, a given reduction
in the chemical concentration of some toxin, when perceived as involving a 1-in-1,000 risk-reduction, will (or at least may) produce a
larger number of avoided fear-days then the same reduction in
chemical concentration perceived to involve a 1-in-100,000 reduction
in fatality risk. (3) Predictingfear. There is much evidence to suggest
that individuals are not always accurate in predicting their future
emotional states, including fear and anxiety states. 128 This is a further
source of deviation between an individual's stated willingness-to-pay
to remove some feared hazard, and her welfare equivalent for removal. Imagine a favorable case for the "bundled" valuation of fear
and risk. Individuals are not afflicted by "probability neglect"; the
actual and perceived risk-reductions of removing some hazard are the
same; the deaths that would result from the hazard are not "stigmatized." An exposed individual is asked to value regulatory intervention. Deciding in conformity with expected utility theory, she
conceptualizes the intervention as a lottery J* differing from baseline
lottery J in that her probability of premature death is lower, and N
fewer fear-days occur. If in fact the reduction in fear-days is M not N,
then her valuation will deviate from her true welfare equivalent for
J*.
To sum up: "Probability neglect," the deviation between actual
and perceived risk, and the absence of any simple connection between perceived risk (let alone actual risk) and fear, as well as other
problems, undermine the three "bundled valuation" techniques I
have considered. The simplest solution is to monetize fear and risk
separately. Consider the stylized case, and the problem of valuing the
moderate option. That option maps onto a lottery L* which, as a matter of objective welfare goods, differs from L in two ways: by changing the subject's risk of a disease with certain morbidity and fatality
characteristics and by changing his fear states. Imagine, then, a lottery
L+ that involves the very same change in the subject's actual mortality and morbidity risk as L* (in this example, 1 in 100,000) but no
change in his fear states, and a lottery L++ that involves the very
128. See George Loewenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice? Predicting Future
Feelings, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 85 (Daniel Kahne-

man et al. eds., 1999).
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same change in the subject's perceived risk and concomitant fear
states as U, but no change in his actual mortality and morbidity risk.
My suggestion is that we estimate the welfare equivalent for L* by
summing the welfare equivalents for L+ and L++.
Less formally: we use market or contingent-valuation data to estimate welfare equivalents for the actual, 1-in-100,000 reduction in the
risk of a disease with the morbidity and mortality characteristics of
cancer (but with the welfare-irrelevant "stigma" of cancer eliminated,
as far as possible, from the valuation). Welfare equivalents for riskreductions should be roughly a linear function of the reduced risk,
where small risks are involved, and so the cumulative risk-reduction
benefit can be estimated as the number of deaths avoided (ten in this
case) multiplied by a VOSL number. Separately, we predict the
change in fear states that the subject will experience as result of the
lower toxin level, via his lower perceived risk of cancer and other determinants of fear, and use contingent-valuation techniques (as elaborated below) to determine his welfare equivalent for that reduction in
fear taken alone. The latter step is just what I have called "fear assessment." The output of this fear assessment-a monetary valuation
of the change in the subject's fear states flowing from the mitigation
of the hazard-can be added to the monetized value of the change in
his risk of disease and death flowing from the mitigation of that hazard to approximate his all-in monetary valuation of the mitigation.
To be sure, there is an additivity assumption here that is not warranted under all conditions. The monetary equivalent for the welfare
impact of fear plus risk is not necessarily equal to, or even well approximated by, the monetary equivalent for the welfare impact of fear
plus the monetary equivalent for the welfare impact of risk. Providing
a rigorous analysis of the additivity issue is beyond the scope of this
Article. Intuitively, one might say this: where the anticipatory fear of
a fatal disease or injury, and the fatal disease or injury itself, make
roughly independent contributions to a subject's welfare, and where
the fear of the disease does not substantially change the welfare productivity ("marginal utility") of money, the additive technique just
described will provide a good approximation to the subject's true welfare equivalent. 1 9 These conditions are quite plausible, at least where
129. It seems intuitively clear that, where fear and longevity do not make independent
contributions to the subject's welfare, additivity can break down. Here is an extreme example. P
can live a long life or a shorter life. His lives can be more or less anxious. Once a certain high
level of anxiety is reached, longer life is no better than shorter life. In the baseline lottery L, P
for certain will live a long life and a calm life. In the comparison lottery L*, P is at some risk r of
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the fear states produced by some hazard do not result in widespread
changes to a subject's activities and relationships (which would tend
to produce a substantial change in the marginal utility of money).
Where the additivity conditions do break down, the best alternative to the "unbundled" valuation of fear and risk is, I suggest, a
fourth kind of "bundled" technique: one where the agency predicts
both the actual risk-reduction and the fear-days avoided by some
regulatory intervention, and uses a contingent-valuation interview to
determine willingness-to-pay for a lottery differing from baseline by
those combined changes. In our stylized case, assume that the agency
makes the following predictions about the moderate and strict opliving a shorter life, and all his possible lives are extremely anxious, so much so that the longer
possible lives in L* are no better than the shorter possible lives. Consider, now, L+, a lottery
which has the same risk characteristics as L* but not the fear characteristics. In L+, P has a
probability r of living a shorter calm life, and a probability 1-r of living a longer calm life. And
consider L++, a lottery that has the same fear characteristics as L* but not the risk
characteristics: in L++, P for certain lives a long, extremely anxious life. In this case (assuming
money has the same utility in all the worlds), it is clear that P's welfare equivalent for L* is not
the sum of his welfare equivalents for L+ and L++. Rather, his welfare equivalent for L* just
equals his welfare equivalent for L++. Once we have injected sufficient anxiety into P's lives to
make the longer lives no better than the shorter ones (L++), adding a risk of shorter life (L*)
makes no difference to the expected utility of the lottery over lives.
Similarly, it seems intuitively clear that, where fear changes the marginal utility of
money, additivity can break down. Assume P is now forty. In L, he lives to seventy for sure. In
L*, he has a risk r of dying at the age of sixty, 1-r of dying at age seventy, and he experiences
terrible anxiety in the immediate future, which abates once he's forty-one. This anxiety radically
deflates the utility of money for P. In L+, P has a risk r of dying at age sixty, and no anxiety. In
L++, he experiences terrible anxiety in the immediate future and no incremental risk. Here, it
seems, P's welfare equivalent for L* (in the "willingness to ask" sense, i.e., the amount we'd
have to pay P in L* in the immediate future to make him just as well off as in L) exceeds the
sum of his welfare equivalents for L+ and L++, again in the willingness-to-ask sense-at least if
there's no possibility of investing the money. To compensate P for L*, we need to compensate
him both for the welfare loss of the terrible anxiety, and for the expected welfare loss associated
with the incremental risk of premature death. But the latter compensation would have to be
effected at the money/welfare tradeoff rate of L*, where P is terribly anxious and therefore a
given welfare increment requires more dollars than in L+.
As for the flip case, where fear and longevity do make independent contributions, and
fear does not substantially affect the welfare productivity of money: Imagine (as is standardly
assumed in the OALY literature) that an individual's lifetime welfare can be represented as a
sum of well-being in each year, i.e., there is intertemporal independence. Thus a case in which
the hazard creates an incremental risk of fatal injury or disease in later years (e.g., a cancer that
will result, if at all, years down the line), and a fear that's experienced in earlier years, is one in
which fear and risk make independent contributions to welfare. Assume, now, that the fear is
not so intense as to change the welfare productivity of money. Then additivity would seem to
obtain. Concretely, in lottery L, P lives to seventy for sure. In L* he has a risk r of dying at age
sixty, and he experiences moderate anxiety for a year about that prospect; this anxiety is a
hedonic loss, but it doesn't change the welfare/money tradeoff. In L+, P has a risk r of dying at
sixty but no anxiety; in L++ he has moderate anxiety but no risk. Then (1) the difference
between L* and L, in utility terms, does equal the sum of the utility difference between L+ and
L and the utility difference between L++ and L; and (2) the amount of money it takes, in L+,
L++, and L* to compensate for a given utility difference is the same.
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tions: the moderate option will avoid ten deaths and one million feardays (one for each individual in the population), while the strict option will avoid twenty deaths and twenty-five million fear-days
(twenty-five for each individual). Then L* is a lottery differing from
baseline by a reduced fatality risk of I in 100,000 and one fewer fearday, while L:* is a lottery differing from baseline by a reduced
fatality risk of 2 in 100,000 and twenty-five fewer fear-days. Contingent-valuation interviews would then be conducted inquiring about
willingness-to-pay for the two lotteries thus described. Note that this
technique does require agencies to quantify fear, and in that sense to
engage in fear assessment, but it values fear- and risk-reductions together, not separately.
The difficulties with this fourth and final "bundled" technique
are various. First, it would impose greater cognitive demands on
interview subjects than asking them separately about willingness-topay to avoid risk and willingness-to-pay to avoid fear. Second, it
would inhibit standardization, thereby increasing deliberation costs
and making CBA more vulnerable to inexpert or politicized agencies. 130 "Unbundled" fear assessment would allow agencies to develop
a standard cost per fear-day, paralleling the standard cost per death
beginning to emerge in current regulatory practice; 31 quantifying
fear- and death-reduction might be difficult, but monetizing this
reduction would be straightforward. By contrast, the "bundled" technique now being considered would presumably require agencies to
conduct separate contingent-valuation interviews for each of its
options, unless a standardized valuation function for combinations of
fear- and risk-reduction could somehow be developed. Third, and
perhaps most importantly, the technique is inconsistent with the
VOSL method now widely used by agencies to value risk-reductions.
Risks would instead be valued directly, in combination with fear,
rather than indirectly by multiplying deaths by a money price. The
final "bundled" technique would therefore constitute a fairly radical
change in current CBA practices. Perhaps, on balance, this change is
warranted. Again, the additivity conditions undergirding "unbundied" fear assessment may break down and, where they do, radical
change might be a good thing.

130. On Ihe importance of agency expertise and fidelity in choosing among variants of CBA,
see Adler & Posner, supra note 42, at 217-18.
131. Seesupra note 69.
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Or perhaps not. Comparing the fourth and final "bundled" technique to "unbundled" fear assessment is a truly difficult enterprise,
beyond the scope of this Article. What I have established, I hope, is
that the best way to incorporate fear costs within CBA, consistent
with current, VOSL-based practices for monetizing risk-reduction, is
"unbundled" fear assessment. The only variant of "bundling" consistent with VOSLs is Revesz's proposal to use "tailored" VOSLs. And
that kind of "bundling" is deeply problematic. It is hard to see how
that approach, rather than "unbundled" fear assessment, could be the
incremental change to current CBA practice that we would be justified in making. For the remainder of the Article, I will focus on
"unbundled" fear assessment and consider how agencies, within that
context, should develop a price for fear states.
III. PRICING FEAR STATES: REVEALED PREFERENCE OR
CONTINGENT VALUATION?

Assume I am correct that agencies should engage in "unbundled" fear assessment, at least under certain conditions. Agencies
should predict, and separately value, the change in fear states resulting from the mitigation or elimination of feared hazards. How, then,
should these fear states be monetized? To begin, should fear assessment draw its values from revealed-preference or rather contingentvaluation studies?
Revealed-preference and contingent-valuation studies are the
13 2
two standard sources of WTP/WTA values employed by CBA.
Revealed-preference studies use behavior to infer a valuation. Most
straightforwardly, the price of a marketed good evidences the WTP of
the marginal consumer. Various revealed-preference methods also
exist for valuing goods that are not the direct subject of market transactions. For example, WTPs for environmental amenities can be inferred from "travel cost" data (park users are willing to incur greater
direct travel costs and foregone wages to visit parks they prefer
t 34
more), 33 or from the variation of housing prices near amenities.
WTP/WTA for the risk of death can be inferred from the wage differ135
ential between more and less dangerous occupations. As for "contingent valuation" studies, these are based on interviews or mail
132.
133.
134.
135.

See FREEMAN, supra note 23, at 95-136, 161-87.
See id. at 419-33.
See id. at 353-97.
See id. at 297-321; VISCUSI,supra note 87, at 34-75.
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surveys, where respondents are asked to express their preferences as
between goods, or lotteries of goods, and money.'36 Most simply,
average WTP for a good might be elicited by asking respondents
"What is the maximum you are willing to pay?" for the good, and
averaging the responses. A variety of other, more sophisticated survey techniques have been developed over the forty-some years since
the inception of contingent-valuation work. A widely followed approach today is to employ so-called "single-bounded, dichotomouschoice" questions. Each respondent is asked "Would you be willing to
pay $X?" for the good, where the queried amount is varied among
respondents; econometric techniques are then applied to the survey
answers to infer an average WTP. 137
Although the correct CBA construct is the welfare equivalent,
not WTP/WTA, revealed-preference and contingent-valuation studies
would also be the main data source for welfare equivalents. In particular, as I have already suggested, welfare equivalents can often be
derived from revealed-preference or contingent-valuation studies
evidencing WTP/WTA with respect to a recharacterized set of agency
choices.
I have no quarrel with revealed-preference methods in other
contexts. But they are, I think, a problematic tool for valuing fear
states, and thus a problematic tool for regulators engaging in "unbundied" fear assessment as I have described it.138 Let us simplify matters
by ignoring the possibility of uncertainty with respect to fear states
themselves, and ask how we should determine P's welfare equivalent
136. For overviews of the contingent-valuation method and the literature about it, see

generally

IAN J. BATEMAN ET.

AL., ECONOMIC

VALUATION WITH STATED PREFERENCE

TECHNIQUES: A MANUAL (2002): FREEMAN, supra note 23, at 161-87; ROBERT CAMERON
MITCHELL &

RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE

CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD (1989); VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES:
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD IN THE US, EU, AND

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Ian J. Bateman & Kenneth G. Willis eds., 1999).
137. See BATEMAN ET AL., supra note 136, at 138-42 (discussing different methods for
eliciting monetary values in contingent-valuation surveys). As the authors explain, the singlebounded dichotomous choice technique is itself now being refined to eliminate possible
characteristic biases (perhaps a nay-saying bias) and to elicit more information from respondents. See id. at 141 (discussing one-and-a-half bound and double-bounded dichotomous choice
formats).
138. Whether revealed-preference techniques would be useful for agencies employing the
fourth "bundled" valuation methodology I described above, in Part 1I.B, is a different question.
Even within the context of that methodology, contingent valuation would seem to be the more
natural technique, since an individual's revealed WTP to avoid some feared hazard might well
diverge from his or her WE for the bundle of fear- and risk-reduction by virtue of probability
neglect. But the comparative merits of contingent-valuation and revealed-preference techniques
for pricing packages of risk- and fear-reduction is not an issue I can address here.
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for an outcome W* that differs from the baseline outcome W solely
by virtue of the fact that P experiences fear in W*. Details involving
the choice of fear scale can also be bracketed: assume that individuals
are placed in the binary categories of fearful/not fearful for a given
day, and our fear assessment predicts the total fear-days resulting
from hazards. P, then, experiences a certain incremental number of
fear-days in W* as compared to W. How to determine the money
amount that, added to his resources in W* (or subtracted from his
resources in W), truly compensates him for the difference?
The deep difficulty in using market transactions or other behavioral evidence to value fear-days is that of untangling the subject's
WTP/WTA to avoid the risk of a feared outcome, from his
WTP/WTA to avoid fear itself. Typically, market transactions tie
both benefits together. If I am scared of dying in a car crash, and pay
more to buy a car with airbags, then what I have purchased is both
peace of mind (fewer fear-days) and a reduced risk of the outcome I
fear (dying in a crash). The incremental price of cars with airbags
does not, in any direct way, reveal the WTP of car drivers for fearavoidance: rather, it directly reveals their WTP for the combination of
fear-avoidance and risk-reduction. Similarly, if I am scared of being
crushed on a factory floor, and demand higher wages to run that risk,
then the wages are compensation both for the higher risk and for the
additional anxious days I will experience as compared to a safer job.
The wage differentials between safer and riskier jobs reveal
WTPIWTAs for a package of goods, including but not limited to fearreduction.
Regression analysis might be thought to offer one route around
this difficulty. Observed WTP/WTA data for market transactions that
reduce the risk of feared outcomes might be "regressed" on various
independent variables, including both the degree of risk-reduction
and the number of fear-days reduced. 39 The coefficient for the fearday variable could be used to infer welfare equivalents for fearreduction itself. Ian Savage employed roughly this methodology in a
study where he correlated revealed-preference estimates of WTP to
reduce the risk of different types of fatalities (specifically, fatalities
caused by domestic fires, automobiles, air pollution, cigarettes,

139. See BATEMAN ET AL., supra note 136, at 182-9t (discussing the "bid function." which
"explains the variation in WTP/WTA response based on the change in and the characteristics of
the non-market good, prices of market goods, income and other socio-economic characteristics
of the respondents").
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airlines, and nuclear power) with individual dread of those fatalities,
as measured by Slovic's psychometric surveys.t 40 The problem here is
the confounding effect of fear on choice under uncertainty: one of the
problems that led us to separate risk assessment from fear assessment
in the first place. Imagine that I can be seen paying $100 for a smoke
alarm, $600 for an airbag, and $6,100 for a house further from the
nuclear plant, and that in each case my risk of death would be reduced by 1 in 10,000. It further emerges that the smoke alarm buys
me no relief from fear (since I do not fear house fires); the airbag
buys me ten days relief (the total time I would spend in an anxiety
state in a car without an airbag); and the house away from the nuclear
plant buys me 100 days relief (the total incremental fear-days I would
experience with the closer house). Can we infer that my welfare
equivalent not to experience a single fear-day is $50-$60, calculated
as (1) the incremental WTP for the air bag or house ($500 or $6000)
compared to a good, the smoke alarm, that produces the very same
risk-reduction but no fear-reduction, divided by (2) the total fearreduction purchased with the air bag or house (ten or 100 days)?
This is a problematic inference, given the literature on probability neglect. An alternative and quite plausible explanation of the difference between my revealed valuations is that, because I am scared
of car crashes and even more scared of nuclear plants, I irrationally
overweight the risks associated with these. My very approach to
choice changes by virtue of being afraid. More generally, a positive
coefficient on the fear-days variable in a regression equation predicting revealed WTP could indicate a positive WTP to avoid the outcome of fear, or it could reflect increasingly panicky choosers.1 4
A different revealed-preference approach to disentangling the
values of fear-reduction and risk-avoidance might focus on a special
class of market transactions-those where the only good purchased is
fear-reduction. For example, we might observe what anxious individuals pay for psychiatric services to alleviate their distress. This
140. See Ian Savage, PsychologicalFeatures Affecting Valuation of Life, 35 ECON. LET-rERS
379 (1991).
141. Yet more sophisticated regression techniques might be able to distinguish between the
impact on WTP for reduced risk of the chooser's present anxiety and the impact of the anticipated reduction in fear-days. Make our independent variables (inter alia) fatality risk reduction,
fear-days reduced, and the present fearfulness of the actor whose WTP is being observed. This
could do the trick-but there might well be a sample size problem, since welfare equivalents for
anticipated fear-days would be revealed by choosers whose present fearfulness is zero, and the
number of such fearless choosers identified in studies of the relevant market transactions (those
involving feared outcomes) could well be small.
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approach is intriguing, but still problematic. First, anxious individuals
do not know, when they purchase anxiety-reduction services, what
the actual degree of anxiety-reduction will be. What we observe, then,
is their WTP/WTA for a lottery with respect to fear-reduction; this
WTP/WTA amount is good evidence of their welfare equivalent for
that lottery, or a good basis for deriving their welfare equivalent for a
certain change in fear states, only on the assumption that the individuals behave in rough conformity with expected utility theory-a
heroic assumption, surely, for the population suffering sufficiently
serious anxiety to consult psychiatrists. Second, the fact that a substantial portion of those purchasing anxiety-reduction services are
phobics may also skew their revealed WTPIWTA for fear-reduction
away from the average welfare equivalent for the general population;
as already explained, phobia is a nonstandard case of fear, since core
fear involves belief, not merely thought. Finally, and most importantly, the appropriate emotional condition for a subject attempting
to determine his welfare equivalent for fear-reduction is a calm state,
not a fearful state. P's welfare equivalent for some outcome or lottery
is the amount that he would accept or pay for the outcome or lottery,
aroused) and well
were he to be calm (not fearful or otherwise
14 2
thoroughly.
informed and to have deliberated
Fortunately, revealed-preference techniques are not the only
game in town. The contingent-valuation technique is now accepted by
43
a substantial segment of the economics community. Literally thou144
sands of such studies have been undertaken by applied economists;
a large theoretical literature focused on improving the technique's
t45
validity and reliability has developed; and WTP/WTA estimates
derived from contingent-valuation studies are regularly employed by
1 46
agencies, both in the course of CBA and in other contexts. The bulk
142. See infra Part IV.B.
143. See Ian J. Bateman & Kenneth G. Willis, Introduction and Overview, in VALUING
ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES, supra note 136, at 1-5 (describing continuing controversy
over contingent valuation, characterized by both substantial support for and opposition to the
method in the economics community).
144. See Richard T. Carson et al., A Bibliography of Contingent Valuation Studies and
Papers (Natural Resource Damage Assessment Inc., 1995) (unpublished paper).
145. See, e.g., FREEMAN, supra note 23, at 161-87 (summarizing efforts to improve method);
Richard C. Bishop et al., Contingent Valuation, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ECONOMICS, supra note 101, at 629, 629-54 (reviewing literature on validity of contingent
valuation).
146. See Bateman & Willis, supra note 143, at 1-5; John B. Loomis, Contingent Valuation
Methodology and the US Institutional Framework, in VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL
PREFERENCES, supra note 136, at 613, 613-27.
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of studies conducted to date focus on public environmental goods.
But this is neither in principle nor in practice a methodology merely
for valuing cleaner parks and richer ecosystems. Health economists
have used interviews to elicit WTP/WTA for a range of disease states,
inter alia "light morbidity" conditions such as angina; throat, sinus, or
head congestion; headache; runny nose; cough and sneeze; eye irritation; nausea; and shortness of breath.1"' These are roughly analogous
qua well-being to anxiety in that they can occur in acute (short term)
as well as chronic form, and in degrees of intensity; the welfare impact
of the less intense acute form is largely hedonic (a day with a moderate headache, like a day spent moderately anxious, is a welfare setback largely because it feels bad); and the chronic or intense forms,
like chronic or intense anxiety, will also have nonhedonic impacts
such as avoided activities. The contingent-valuation technique should
be no less applicable to fear/anxiety than to "light" physical diseases
such as headaches, nausea, and angina. Nor should it be less applicable to fear/anxiety than to psychiatric conditions, or the pain and
awareness states that concern anesthesiologists. The contingentvaluation technique is beginning to make headway into the literature
on mental health economics, where it has been used to value depression,' 4 1 and the literature on anesthesia, which now includes published
studies eliciting WTP/WTA to avoid intraoperative awareness. 49
Surprisingly, given the range of diseases and experiences for
which WTP/WTAs have been elicited through interviews, the contingent-valuation literature on fear or anxiety itself is almost
147. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 67; Tolley, supra note 67. On the use of contingentvaluation interviews to value health states, see generally VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY, supra
note 56; Alan Diener et al., Health Care Contingent Valuation Studies: A Review and Classification of the Literature, 7 HEALTH ECON. 313 (1998); Thomas Klose, The Contingent Valuation
Method in Health Care, 47 HEALTH POLICY 97 (1999); Jan Abel Olsen & Richard D. Smith,
Theory Versus Practice: A Review of "Willingness-to-Pa)"' in Health and Health Care, 10
HEALTH ECON. 39 (2001); Richard D. Smith, Construction of the Contingent Valuation Market
in Health Care: A CriticalAssessment, 12 HEALTH ECON. 609 (2003).
148. See Jirgen Uniltzer et al., Willingness to Pay for Depression Treatmentin Primary Care,
54 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 340 (2003). On economic evaluation (including cost-benefit evaluation) of mental health more generally, see S. M. A. A. Evers ct al., Economic Evaluation of
Mental Health Care Interventions: A Review, 6 HEALTH ECON. 161 (1997); Andrew Healey &
Daniel Chisholm, Willingness to Pay as a Measure of the Benefits of Mental Health Care, 2 J.
MENTAL HEALTH POL'Y & ECON. 55 (1999); Bruce Singh et al., The Role of Economic Evaluation in Mental Health Care,35 AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND J. PSYCHIATRY 104 (2001).
149. See Tong J. Gan et al., How Much Are Patients Willing to Pay to Avoid lntraoperative
Awareness?, 15 J. CLINICAL ANESTHESIA 108 (2003); Kate Leslie et al., Patients' Knowledge of
and Attitudes Towards Awareness and Depth of Anaesthesia Monitoring, 31 ANAESTHESIA &
INTENSIVE CARE 63 (2003); see also Debora Matthews et al., Putting Your Money Where Your
Mouth Is: Willingness to Pay for Dental Gel, 20 PHARMACOECONOMICS 245 (2002) (evaluating
WTP for novel, noninjectable dental anaesthetic).
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nonexistent. I have identified only a single study where respondents
were asked directly for their monetary valuation of a fear or anxiety
state: Zeidner and Shechter's study of Israeli university students,
5
which inquired about WTP to reduce test anxiety. ' Other contingent-valuation studies have measured the respondents' anxiety, and
included that as one of the independent variables in an estimated "bid
function," with WTP/WTA to reduce risk or purchase other goods as
the dependent variable 15 -but for reasons that should now be evident, these sorts of contingent-valuation studies (like their revealedpreference counterparts) are a problematic basis for inferring the cost
of fear.
The case against contingent valuation of fear, if there is one, will
have to be generic, not specific. It is hard to see why the technique
would be appropriate for environmental goods, but not health states;
or serious diseases, but not light morbidity; or light morbidity and
certain mental states (for example, headaches or intraoperative
awareness) but not fear. The claim would have to be that contingent
valuation, in general, is a flawed tool for measuring WTP/WTA (or,
on my conceptualization of CBA, for measuring the objectivist correlate to WTP/WTA, namely welfare equivalents). And general claims
152
of this sort certainly have been advanced; indeed, the debate beand its global critics has
tween the proponents of contingent valuation 53
economics.
within
generated a mini-literature
It is well beyond the scope of this Article to engage that debate
in a thorough way. (I have already stated, and should stress, that my
150. See Moshe Zeidner & Mordechai Shechter, Reduction of Test Anxiety: A First Attempt
at Economic Evaluation, 7 ANXIETY, STRESS, & COPING 1 (1994).
151. See David N. Fisman et al., Willingness to Pay to Avoid Sharps-Related Injuries: A
Study in Injured Health Care Workers, 30 AM. J. INFECTION CONTROL 283 (2002); Stephanie J.
Lee ct al., Patients' Willingness to Pay for Autologous Blood Donation, 40 HEALTH POL'Y I
(1997); Mandy Ryan, Valuing Psychological Factors in the Provisionof Assisted Reproductive
Techniques Using the Economic Instrument of Willingness to Pay, 19 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 179
(1998); [an Savage, An Empirical Investigation into the Effect of Psychological Perceptionson
the Willingness-to-Pay to Reduce Risk, 6 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 75 (1993); Bruce H. Smith,
Anxiety as a Cost of Commuting to Work. 29 J. URB. ECON. 260 (1991); Eric Thunberg &
Leonard Shabman, Determinants of Landowner's Willingness to Pay for Flood Hazard Reduction, 27 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 657 (1991); Zeidner & Shechter, supra note 41.
152. See, e.g., CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (Jerry A. Hausman ed.,
1993).
153. See, e.g., Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No Number?, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 45 (1994) (presenting criticisms); Peter A.
Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, On Contingent Valuation Measurement of Nonuse Values. in
CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra note 152, at 3-38 (presenting criticisms); Kevin J. Boyle &
John C. Bergstrom, Doubt, Doubts, and Doubters: The Genesis of a New Research Agenda?, in
VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES, supra note 136, at 183 (surveying criticisms).
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opposition to revealed-preference techniques is specific, not generic:
the dual role of fear as a consequence of choice and a condition of the
chooser undercuts the technique's usefulness in the particular domain
of "unbundled" fear assessment.) Suffice it to say that all but one of
the generic objections to contingent valuation seems misplaced, at
least in the case of fear. One set of objections focuses on cognitive
limitations or biases that can be overcome by changing the form of
the interview. For example, answering the open-ended question
"What is the maximum amount you are willing to pay/accept for
_?" is cognitively quite demanding; and reducing this cognitive load
through a "bidding game," where respondents are presented with
increasing monetary amounts, and asked about willingness to trade
the good for these amounts until a maximum is reached, leads to
WTPIWTA estimates that are biased by the initial bid (an instance of
anchoring bias). But both these problems are avoided through the
dichotomous choice format that is currently popular. 154
A different objection is that answers to contingent-valuation surveys express moral judgments or political views, rather than the sorts
of preferences relevant to CBA, namely self-interested ones. Critics
voicing this objection often point to so-called "scope" problems: cases
in which expressed WTP/WTA is invariant to the scope of the good
being evaluated, such as Desvouges' well-known study where different groups of respondents expressed nearly identical mean WTPs to
save 2,000, 20,000, and 200,000 migratory waterfowl. 155 The problem
here has more to do with the good being valued than the valuation
format-preferences for environmental goods revealed through contributions to the Sierra Club also are typically moral rather than selfinterested preferences-and in any event is unlikely to carry over to
the contingent valuation of fear or other experiential or health states,
the heartland of self-interested preferences. Not surprisingly, a recent
survey of health care contingent-valuation studies found little evidence of scope-invariance.116

154. See BATEMAN ET AL., supra note 136. at 138-42.
155. William H. Desvousges et al., Measuring Natural Resource Damages with Contingent
Valuation: Tests of Validity and Reliability, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra note 152, at 91,
99-102.
156. See Klose, supra note 147, at 105-09. Cf. Alan Shiell & Lisa Gold, Contingent Valuation
in Health Care and the Persistence of Embedding Effects Without the Warm Glow, 23 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 251 (2002) (finding "embedding effects" in health care contingent-valuation study
designed to exclude moral preferences).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

JVol 79:977

What about the oft-heard claim that contingent valuation asks
about hypothetical choices, while market and other revealedpreference data evidence actual choices? The respondent is being
asked to compare a baseline lottery or outcome to a different lottery
or outcome packaged with compensating changes to the respondent's
wealth position, where these options are neither his to choose, nor
even the government's to choose (since the actual options being considered by the government do not involve the hypothesized changes
in respondent's wealth). It is hard to know what to make of this objection. Surely non-actual objects (choices, outcomes, things) can, in
principle, be evaluated by humans. For example, the expected utility
model of choice asks humans to value non-actual outcomes-the
merely possible consequences of the agent's choices. Perhaps the
thought is that contingent-valuation questions, qua hypothetical, are
cognitively difficult. But this, once more, would seem to be more a
question of the good evaluated than the elicitation method: consider
the cognitive demands of deciding whether to buy a house, given its
architecture and decor, possibly hidden defects, physical setting, immediate neighborhood, proximity to other goods and bads, and investment value. Thinking about willingness-to-pay to avoid anxiety, at
least in the case of acute anxiety that has a relatively "local" effect on
well-being, is no harder than thinking about willingness-to-pay for
small consumption goods, and in the case of anxiety with more global
effects would not seem to pose qualitatively greater cognitive demands than thinking about willingness-to-pay for a house, an education, or longevity.
Perhaps the complaint about the "hypothetical" cast of contingent-valuation questions goes to the respondents' seriousness. Respondents evaluate these hypothetical choices in a quick, off-hand
way. This is a serious complaint, particularly for my purposes, since
welfare equivalents presuppose thorough deliberation. The complaint
is one part of a broader objection, namely that contingent-valuation
surveys do not produce sincere and truthful answers. Stated preferences do not represent respondents' real preferences: either because
they have not thought enough to formulate those preferences, or because they have but are lying for strategic reasons. On the last count:
it is well known that self-interested actors will often have an incentive
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to overstate or understate their WTP/WTA, depending on the interview format.157
The objection is surely worrying. Still, I do not think it is decisive
against using contingent-valuation studies to value fear. First, respondents to these surveys, and to surveys more generally, seem often to
be more honest than is rational in light of self-interest.'5 8 Second, and
relatedly, interview format can help encourage honesty and deliberational work. (For example, paying respondents for their time can intensify guilt feelings that, intuitively, would help counteract shirking
and lying.) Third, the fact that some respondents can be predicted to
give untruthful responses to interview questions need not erase the
epistemic value of the interviews. Randomly untruthful responses are
one thing; but if I have theoretical grounds for believing in a correlation between stated and real preferences, e.g., for believing that strategic untruths in a given context will overstate real welfare
equivalents, then the contingent-valuation data will provide some
evidence of real welfare equivalents. Finally, worries about sincerity
and honesty provide no reason at all to use revealed-preference
rather than contingent-valuation techniques insofar as the revealedpreference techniques incorporate self-report measures of fear. Understand that the revealed-preference technique will correlate the
subjects' fear states with their WTP/WTA to mitigate those states or
reduce the chance of the outcomes that the subjects fear. But characterizing the subjects' states may well involve interviews: interviews to
determine how scared they are. For example, the "dread" variable
upon which Ian Savage regressed revealed WTP to avoid deaths from
domestic fires, automobiles, air pollution, cigarettes, airlines, and
nuclear power was derived from Slovic's psychometric work, and that
in turn was grounded on survey data where respondents were interviewed to determine how they viewed different hazards. 159 Why assume that respondents to Slovic's interviews are truthful, while
respondents to contingent-valuation interviews are not?
To be sure, fear measures grounded in observer-reports rather
than self-reports do exist. A psychiatrist or some other expert might
be asked to scale the fearful individual's anxiety, as evidenced by her
157. See, e.g., Robert Sugden, Public Goods and Contingent Valuation, in VALUING
ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES, supra note 136, at 131, 135-39.
158. See id. at 137-38.
159. See Savage, supra note 140, at 382; Paul Slovic et al., Characterizing Perceived Risk, in
PERILOUS PROGRESS: MANAGING THE HAZARDS OF TECHNOLOGY 91 (Robert W. Kates et al.
eds., 1985).
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behavior or physiology; that observer-reported measure might then
be correlated with the subject's purchasing activities to derive a revealed-preference measure of her WTP/WTA to avoid fear. But even
this technique may presuppose more honesty and sincerity than axioms of individual rationality and self-interest would predict-by presupposing that the psychiatrist or other observer has truthfully
communicated the fear state he observes, and has put some effort into
the observation. In short, a substantial degree of trust (be it in subjects or observers) seems to be as much a precondition of revealedpreference techniques as of contingent-valuation techniques, and if so
the problem of respondent honesty and sincerity is no grounds for
abandoning the second set of techniques in favor of the first.
IV.

USING CONTINGENT VALUATION TO VALUE FEAR STATES

I have argued that "contingent valuation" interviews should be
used to attach a money price to fear states, at least where agencies
engage in "unbundled" fear assessment. But what, precisely, is being
valued? And whose valuations count? This Part engages these fundamental issues, then considers and endorses the thought that indirectly as well as directly derived money prices might be useful for
CBA. By "directly derived," I mean a money price elicited through a
classic contingent-valuation interview: one where the respondent is
asked for her WTP/WTA. By "indirectly derived," I mean an interview format where the respondent is asked to measure fear on some
other scale of well-being, such as a QALY scale, and these measurements are then converted to WTP/WTA through some standard conversion factor. 160

160. Another question is whether fear is priced ex post or ex ante. Should the fear assessor
(say) estimate the mean difference in fear-days as between different regulatory options, and
then price this difference using an ex post valuation of a fear-day derived from contingent
valuation? Or should she, instead, characterize the lottery over fear states that different members of the population face, and employ contingent valuation to price these lotteries? This Part
assumes that the first approach, or something like it, is correct, given the extra deliberation costs
of ex ante valuation, and discusses the design of contingent-valuation interviews to capture an ex
post valuation of fear. But the claims in this Part generally carry over to ex ante valuation. Specifically, ex ante valuations could focus (narrowly) on the intrinsic costs of fear, or (more encompassingly) on instrumental as well as intrinsic costs; the evaluators should be calm, not
fearful; and appropriate QA LY measures could be translated into ex ante monetary valuations.
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A.

What is a FearState?

"Unbundled" fear assessment asks CBA analysts to disaggregate
two kinds of welfare costs that regulatory choices may have: the bad
outcomes that prompt fear (deaths, injuries), and fear itself. Relatedly, contingent-valuation interviews should be the core technique for
monetizing fear itself. These claims have an obvious implication for
the design of the requisite contingent-valuation interviews. Those
should be focused tightly on fear states, not on a looser amalgam of
fear states and feared outcomes, as most interview work to date in
this area has been. An illustrative example: Fisman et al. surveyed
health care workers who reported a sharps-related injury while handling a contaminated medical device, asking "Suppose there was a
reusable device that could have prevented your injury. Knowing what
you know now, would you have paid $X out of pocket for such a device?"161 The median time from injury to interview was three days,
and although some of the interviewees had obtained definitive information about their risk of infection, some had not. Not surprisingly,
the median reported WTP to avoid the injury was $850, substantially
larger than WTP/WTA amounts elicited in contingent-valuation interviews for headache-days, angina-days, cold- and cough-days, and
other light morbidities that (intuitively) should be roughly comparable in their welfare impact to fear.1 62 Workers in the Fisman study
who had not yet learned their infection status would be paying to
avoid both the risk and the fear of infection, and presumably even
some of those who had received a negative test prior to the contingent-valuation interview ascribed a nonzero probability to the infection outcome, for example, because of test inaccuracy.
Zeidner and Shechter, in their contingent-valuation study of
exam anxiety among Israeli students, did focus narrowly on fear
states. 163 This study illustrates a different point, one that to this point I
have downplayed: namely, that fear states themselves are heterogeneous in their impact on human well-being. Students in two required
introductory courses, one in economics and the other in education,
were asked about willingness-to-pay to reduce their exam anxiety.
The interviews occurred towards the end of the semester, prior to the
161. See Fisman et al., supra note 151, at 284.
162. See infra text accompanying note 193.
163. See Zeidner & Shechter, supra note 150. A different Zeidner and Shechter contingentvaluation study estimates willingness-to-pay to reduce air pollution as a function (inter alia) of
anxiety. See supra note 41 and text accompanying note 151.
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final exam in both classes. Economics students had on average a
higher WTP. A partial explanation of the difference, Zeidner and
Shechter suggest, is that anxiety had greater expected, professional
costs for the economics students than for the education students.
Although a passing grade in both courses was required for further
coursework in the respective majors, the pass rate in economics was
much lower than that in education. Thus anxiety was less likely to
prevent the education students, as compared to the economics students, from passing their tests and continuing in their majors. Fear
states are both intrinsically bad (as a kind of negative experiential
state) and instrumentally bad (insofar as fear causes or partly constitutes other welfare setbacks). The WTP values elicited in the
Zeidner/Shechter study reflected the students' willingness-to-pay to
avoid the combination of the intrinsic and instrumental costs of fear;
because fear had greater instrumental costs, qua professional success,
for the economics students, their WTP amounts were higher.
The distinction between the intrinsic and instrumental welfare
effect of fear states is crucial. Any self-conscious and decently theorized practice of fear assessment must take account of that distinction.
To see it in a more general way, consider Martha Nussbaum's list of
objective welfare goods-the broadest and arguably the best list in
the current philosophical literature: (1) life; (2) bodily health; (3) bodily integrity; (4) senses, imagination, and thought ("[bleing able to use
the senses, to imagine, think, and reason"); (5) emotions (inter alia
"[n]ot having one's emotional development blighted by... fear and
anxiety); (6) practical reason ("[bleing able to form a conception of
the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of
one's life"); (7) affiliation ("[b]eing able to live with and toward others,.., to engage in various forms of social interaction"); (8) other
species; (9) play ("[b]eing able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational
activities"); (10) control over one's environment. 164P's fear is, without more, a setback with respect to Nussbaum's fifth dimension of
welfare: the "emotions" dimension. But P's fear may also cause him
to refrain from activities that would be beneficial with respect to
other welfare dimensions. For example, if P is afraid of some object
or activity he may substitute a different, more dangerous one, thus
risking his life or health (dimensions one and two). P's fears may lead
him to refrain from activities that advance his goals (dimension six),
or from social interaction (dimension seven). If P's fears hinder his
164. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 46, at 78-80.
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productivity, either because he is scared of particular workplaces or
because a general anxiety state makes him less productive in any
workplace, then fear might cause a drop in P's income, in turn causing
setbacks with respect to all the dimensions for which money is useful
(dimensions 1-10).
The causal impact of fear states on welfare goods is one kind of
"instrumental" impact, but not the only kind. I am using "instrumental" to mean any nonintrinsic impact, where in turn an intrinsic impact is one that occurs solely in virtue of fear's experiential features.
Fear can be an "instrumental" welfare setback either by causing other
harms, or by displacing the experiential states that are one component of a larger good encompassing both experiential and nonexperiential features. Consider Nussbaum's ninth dimension, play or
recreation. To recreate is to engage in certain activities, and to experience pleasure as a result. If P is scared of the toxin in his soil and
"goes through the motions" of recreating in his backyard, but his fear
state crowds out any enjoyment from these activities, then this fear
has (noncausally) produced a cost with respect to dimension nine. An
even more important example, arguably, involves Nussbaum's fourth,
sixth and seventh dimensions. Theoretical reason, practical reason,
and affiliation are (arguably) welfare goods that essentially include an
enjoyment component. How good for P is a friendship in which he
takes little pleasure (because he's in an anxiety state), or a practical
or intellectual accomplishment that he cannot savor?
Incorporating the instrumental effect of fear within fear assessment is a complicated question, about which I lack firm views. One is
tempted to think that a further unbundling might work here: for any
given fear state, we can predict the (lottery over) other bad outcomes
that the state might produce, and value the fear state as the sum of
the intrinsic cost of fear, plus the (expected) cost of those other outcomes as priced using standard values. 1 5 For example, if P experiences 100 fear-days, and cuts back his recreational activities as a
result, then the cost of fear is the experiential cost of the 100 days,
plus the foregone benefit of the activities as measured by the market
prices of those activities or by revealed-preference or contingentvaluation studies generally pricing the activities. The problem here is
165. In other words, "averting behavior" undertaken to avoid a perceived risk might be
ascribed the same cost, regardless of whether the actor is fearful or fearless. On pricing "averting behavior," see, e.g., FREEMAN, supra note 23, at 337-38; George Tollev & Robert Fabian,
Future Directionsfor Health Value Research, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY, supra note 56,
at 300, 315-16.
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that fear may have the effect of deflating the welfare value of the recreational activities that P continues to engage in-an effect not captured by focusing merely on the foregone activities and valuing those
activities at the price that the population in general, anxious and
nonanxious alike, is willing to pay for them. 166 P goes to the park fifteen times instead of twenty, but the fifteen trips are not as enjoyable
as fifteen trips in a nonfearful state; thus P's welfare equivalent for
the instrumental effect on his recreation is greater than the foregone
five trips multiplied by the amount he would have paid for those five
trips in a nonfearful state (estimated by generic measures for the trips
such as the market price of park entry or generic travel-cost studies.)
More generally, insofar as experiential states have a constitutive role
with respect to welfare dimensions such as affiliation, practical reason, or play that hybridize both experiences and other things, someone's welfare equivalent for a fear state cannot be accurately
decomposed into the sum of WTP/WTA for the bad experience plus
WTP/WTA for the change with respect to the nonexperiential fea167
tures of these additional dimensions.
Yet CBA routinely tolerates inaccuracies, given deliberation
costs. Is estimating the cost of a fear state as the sum of the intrinsic
cost of fear, plus the instrumental cost as priced using generic values,
any different from (say) the multiple inaccuracies currently tolerated
in the pricing of life? There, too, much heterogeneity is suppressed. If
the intrinsic and instrumental aspects of fear are not unbundled, for
CBA purposes, the prospect of standardizing (and thereby economizing on the costs of) fear assessment through a standard tariff of fear
prices becomes dimmer. Perhaps agencies might distinguish between
166. There is a loose analogy, here, to the way in which physical disability can change the
utility of money. See Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical
Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 364 (1988).
167. The point I'm making here can be rephrased in the language of multiattribute utility
theory, more familiar to economists than talk of "intrinsic" and "instrumental." A person's
objective well-being, my concern in this Article, cannot be accurately represented as her location on robustly independent dimensions such that (1) a fear state constitutes a change only with
respect to one dimension, namely some kind of experiential dimension; (2) changes with respect
to other dimensions have the same effect on the person's well-being, regardless of her location
on the fear dimension, and vice versa. Rather, the best representation consists of an experiential
dimension E plus other dimensions D.... D, where some of the D, are not even conceptually
independent of E (it is impossible to concatenate all locations in E with all locations in these
other dimensions) or if conceptually independent, interact with E in a complicated way to determine the subject's well-being. In either event, P's welfare equivalent for the change produced
by fear with respect to D,. . . D. must take account of his location on dimension E. WTP/WITA
amounts for D.... D. changes, elicited in generic contingent-valuation or revealed-preference
studies where respondents or actors may well be located at a different point in the E dimension
than P himself, are imperfect evidence of P's welfare equivalent for those changes.

2004]

FEAR ASSESSMENT

two subpopulations within the group of persons whose fear states are
influenced by agency choices: a subpopulation whose lives are
"locally" affected by fear (the fear resulting from agency choice constitutes an intrinsic setback for them, plus perhaps induces behavioral
changes, but does not alter the welfare-value of their activities in a
pervasive way), and a subpopulation whose lives are "globally" affected. Standard values could be used to price fear-days and avoided
activities within the "locally" affected group; these standard values
for fear-days would be derived from contingent-valuation studies focusing solely on the intrinsic cost of fear. To price the impact of fear
on the "globally" affected subpopulation, an agency could rely upon a
more specialized and holistic contingent-valuation study: one eliciting
WTPIWTA for the combination of fear-days plus the other welfare
changes (professional, social, recreational, etc.) that persons within
this subgroup would undergo.
The difficult issues sketched here are fodder for future research.
I have not taken a position on the shape of optimal agency practice,
but have simply described a basic problem that any agency engaged in
fear assessment and designing or employing interviews to value fear
states would need to confront. The point to recognize is that fear
sometimes has wider effects than the purely experiential. Contingentvaluation studies of fear states might be localized, targeted just at the
intrinsic harm, or holistic, targeted at bundles of intrinsic harms plus
others. Fear assessment surely will rely upon localized studies-at a
minimum, where the fear produced by agency choice is just a local
harm, as was true of the very short-term anxiety states that the FDA
priced in the gloves rulemaking. But holistic studies might also be a
part of optimal CBA.
B.

Whose Valuations Count?

The respondents in a contingent-valuation study of fear (be it a
localized study focused on fear's intrinsic harms, or a holistic study
encompassing both intrinsic and instrumental harms) might themselves be in a fear state, or they might be calm. Assuming that variations in respondents' fear characteristics produce variations in
WTP/WTA-as might well occur16 -which set of valuations is

168. Cf G. Ardine de Wit et al., Sensitivity and Perspective in the Valuation of Health Status:
Whose Values Count?, 9 HEALTH ECON. 109, 110 (2000) (surveying thirty-eight QALY studies
in which different groups were asked for valuation of the same health state, and finding that
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normative for CBA? This question parallels a general question
mooted by health economists: should the respondents to QALY surveys be patients, or rather healthy individuals (such as doctors or
members of the general population)? Many QALY studies of both
kinds have been done; often diseased and healthy individuals provide
different QALY values for the same disease state; and which QALY
16 9
value should count for health policy analysis is controversial.
My response to this problem of specifying respondents' anxiety
condition in contingent-valuation interviews pricing fear, and more
generally respondents' physical or psychological condition in any
study eliciting money or QALY measures of well-being, is to recur to
the objectivist account of welfare that-I have argued-undergirds
interpersonal comparisons and therewith CBA and related kinds of
policy analysis. Objective goods, I have claimed, are features of outcomes that idealized observers prefer. But what does "idealized"
mean? In eliciting WTP/WTA for (say) a highly anxious state, as
compared to a baseline (say, mildly anxious) state, the respondent
might be: (1) absolutely calm; (2) mildly anxious; (3) highly anxious;
or (4) panicked. Note that the respondent's anxiety state can, but
need not, match either of the states being evaluated. 170 Both outcomes
can be hypothetical, not occurrent. So it is our account of welfare
goods, not the evaluative task at hand, that fixes the respondent's
appropriate emotional condition. But what does that account stipulate?
The most sophisticated work developing an idealized preference
17
account of welfare has been done by Peter Railton. Railton defines
a person's good as "what he would want himself to want, or to pursue,
were he to contemplate his present situation from a standpoint fully
and vividly informed about himself and his circumstances, and
"[t]wenty-seven of the 38 studies concluded that patient values are different or sometimes
different from other groups' values").
169. See id.; see also Diener, supra note 147, at 320 (surveying contingent-valuation studies
of health and finding variation in disease status of respondents).
170. Cf.de Wit et al., supra note 168, at 110 (summarizing study designs for comparing
different groups' QALY valuations of health states, many of which ask respondents to value a
hypothetical state rather than their actual state).
171. See Peter Railton, Facts and Values, 14 PHIL. ToPICS 5 (1986); Peter Railton, Moral
Realism, 95 PHIL. REV. 163, 171-84 (1986); see also Connie S.Rosati, Persons, Perspectives,and
Full Information Accounts of the Good, 105 ETHICS 296, 299 & n.7 (1995) (stating that "[Richard] Brandt and Railton provide the most developed discussion of what it is for a person to be
fully informed" and treating Railton's position "as providing the standard formulation of Ideal
Advisor views [of welfare], since it avoids problems to which other formulations are subject
Iincluding Brandt'sl and thus can be regarded as the most fully developed such view").
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entirely free of cognitive error or lapses of instrumental rationality. ' 17 2 This definition, and Raiiton's discussion, emphasizes information, cognition, and means-end rationality as components of the
idealized observer's condition. Railton does not discuss the observer's
emotional state, and so one must infer what his account would imply
about that. Means-end rationality is certainly relevant here-at least
if means-end rationality is understood to encompass the axioms of
expected utility theory, as I believe it should. As we saw earlier, the
literature on "probability neglect" suggests that fearful individuals are
even worse than calm individuals at processing probabilities in accordance with expected utility theory. This seems to imply that Railton's
idealized observer is calm, not fearful.
In response, it might be objected that probabilities are irrelevant
to the particular valuational exercise being considered in this Part: the
comparison of an outcome in which the respondent undergoes a particular anxiety experience for certain, to one in which he for certain
does not undergo that experience. But in other contexts we will want
to determine which lottery, rather than certain outcome, is better for
a person-for example, in determining his welfare equivalent for a
risk of death or bodily injury. It would be odd to vary the emotional
characteristics of the idealized observer, such that he or she is stipulated to be calm in comparing lotteries but anxious in comparing certain outcomes.
Further, a contingent-valuation exercise putatively focused on a
certain outcome will, inevitably, involve a suppressed lottery. Consider the question: "How much are you willing to pay to spend tomorrow in a calm state as opposed to a highly anxious state?" The
alternatives being compared- the respondent's being calm tomorrow
versus the respondent's being highly anxious tomorrow-are not
maximally specified outcomes, complete "possible worlds." Rather,
they are individual states of affairs that specify one attribute of a
complete possible world. The respondent is asked to value alternatives that vary with respect to this attribute; the multiplicity of other
attributes of possible worlds are not stipulated, and the respondent (if
rational) will handle the valuational exercise by attaching probabilities to the remaining attributes, or at least some of them. In other
words, the alternatives under comparison in this and every contingent-valuation interview are, in effect, lotteries: in this case, a lottery

172. Railton, Facts and Values, supra note 171, at 16.
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in which respondent's being calm tomorrow has probability one, but
his emotional state thereafter, his future wealth position, and many
other things about him are uncertain, versus a lottery in which his
probability one and all these other things
being anxious tomorrow has
73
are once more uncertain.1
What about the cognitive and informational elements of Railton's idealization: the stipulation that the observer be "fully and vividly informed about himself and his circumstances, and entirely free
of cognitive error"? Fear does not preclude cognition. Indeed, core
fear as I understand it entails cognition-a belief, which could well be
true or warranted, that the subject has a nontrivial probability of being physically harmed. But one might ask whether the fearful or calm
observer is better situated to grasp the array of ancillary true facts
that may be relevant to valuing fear states. Believing a true fact is
more than merely registering that fact; it means having that fact play a
deliberational role. Some of the literature on anxiety suggests that
fear involves an attention to the feared outcome, and perhaps a
higher-order attention to the fear state itself, that (intuitively) would
74
dampen the deliberational role of other facts. For example, imagine
that a somewhat holistic contingent-valuation study is being conducted, where respondents are asked to consider not just the intrinsic
experiential badness of fear, but the deleterious health effects that
might result from protracted fear. One group of respondents, some
fearful and others calm, are credibly informed that these effects are
large; another group, again with fearful and calm subgroups, is credibly informed the opposite. Intuitively, the calm respondents' valuations of the fear states should vary more than fearful respondents'.
A related issue-less cognitive than imaginative-is whether
fearful or calm respondents are better able vividly to represent to
themselves the emotional states being compared. Calm respondents
are given descriptions of the various mental elements constituting a
more anxious state (the arousal, the cognition, the affect) and a less
anxious state. Ditto for anxious respondents. Which group is better
able to imagine what it would be like to be in both states? Again, the
attentional characteristics of fear would seem to imply that (ceteris
paribus) calm respondents are better able to imagine both states than
173. The same would be true (a bit less obviously) in a more holistic contingent-valuation
interview.
174. See BARLOW, supra note 35, at 249-55: Ben Searle et al., Cognition, Stress and Anxiety,
in STRESS: MYTH, THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra note 38, at 89,93-99.
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fearful respondents. The "ceteris paribus" clause is very important
here. It may well be true that a currently fearful individual who's
been calm at many points in the past is better able to imagine both
fear states and calm states than a calm person who has never been
afraid. But, as between a currently calm person with past experience
of fear, and a currently anxious person with past experience of calm,
the former is plausibly better situated to imagine fearful and calm
states, as well as to give deliberational weight to ancillary facts and to
process probabilities.
To be sure, the issues discussed in the last few paragraphs are
squarely empirical ones. If experimentation in psychology reveals that
fearful individuals, albeit worse at processing probabilities in accordance with expected utility theory, are (otherwise) more deliberationally sensitive to relevant facts, and more imaginative, then the
case for grounding fear assessment on anxious rather than calm valuations of fear and anxiety would be strong.
C. Deriving Fear Pricesfrom QAL Ys
The "QALY" and contingent-valuation methods are parallel, interview-based techniques for measuring value, differing mainly in the
kind of scale used. In the contingent-valuation format, respondents
are asked to use a money scale. In the QALY format, respondents are
asked to rank outcomes-standardly, health states-on a 0-1 scale,
with 1 representing the very best state, and 0 representing death. 17 5
They may be asked to make an intuitive assignment of numbers to
states, or rather instructed to use a technique that generates numbers,
most typically the "standard gamble" or "time trade off" techniques. 17 6 Many hundreds of published QALY studies now exist,177
175. The number 0 is sometimes assigned to the worst state, not death. See Paul Kind. The
EuroQoL Instrument.-An Index of Health-Related Quality of Life, in QUALITY OF LIFE AND
PHARMACOECONOMICS IN CLINICAL TRIALS 191, 194 (Bert Spilker ed., 2d ed. 1996).
176. For overviews of the QALY method for measuring health states. see DOUGLAS
MCCULLOCH, VALUING HEALTH IN PRACTICE: PRIORITIES, QALYs, AND CHOICE (2003);
ERIK NORD, COST-VALUE ANALYSIS IN HEALTH CARE: MAKING SENSE OUT OF QALYS
(1999); Paul Dolan, The Measurement of Health-Related Quality of Life for Use in Resource
Allocation Decisions in Health Care, in 1B HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 1723 (A. J.
Culyer & J. P. Newhouse eds., 2000); Robert Fabian. The Qualy Approach, in VALUING
HEALTH FOR POLICY, supra note 56. at 118; Robert M. Kaplan, Utility Assessment for Estimating Quality-Adjusted Life Years, in VALUING

HEALTH CARE:

COSTS,

BENEFITS.

AND

EFFECTIVENESS OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND OTHER MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 31 (Frank A.

Sloan ed., 1996).
177. See Chaim M. Bell et al., An Off-the-Shelf Help List: A Comprehensive Catalog of
Preference Scores from Published Cost-Utility Analyses, 21 MED. DECISION MAKING 288, 289
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including some that provide QALY values for anxiety. 178 QALYs are
also, sometimes, translated into dollar values using conversion factors. 17 9 Indeed, this is what FDA did in the gloves rulemaking to value
infection-anxiety. It used a conversion value of $373,000 for the loss
of a single year of life at QALY level 1.
The QALY-to-dollars conversion technique is not uncontroversial, 80 but is acceptable for purposes of CBA as I conceptualize it
if respondents are instructed to think of the QALY scale as a welfare
scale-a point I will discuss in a moment-and if the conversion factor is appropriate. By an "appropriate" conversion factor, I mean one
that produces a reasonably good estimate of subjects' welfare equivalents for changes in states-perhaps the average ratio of WTP/WTA
values and QALY increments for changes in health states that have
been valued using both techniques; 8 ' or the conversion factor implied
by WTP/WTA for the risk of death, on the assumption that individuals value risks of premature death by valuing the risk of the QALY
loss (relative to longer life) that premature death involves.'82 Specifying this conversion factor is an important problem for CBA that
needs further analysis, which I cannot provide here, but there seems
no reason in principle-on the view that CBA is a decision procedure
implementing overall well-being-to resist the very idea of QALY-todollar conversions.

(2001) (finding 228 published "cost-utility" studies (i.e., cost-effectiveness studies that use
QALYS as the measure of effectiveness) published in English in the period from 1976 until
1997, with a total of 949 QALY valuations of health states).
178. See infra note 194 & accompanying text; Dennis G. Fryback et al., The Beaver Dam
Health Outcomes Study: Initial Catalog of Health-State Quality Factors, 13 MED. DECISION
MAKING 89, 94-97 (1993). On the use of QALYS in measuring mental health generally, see D.
Chisholm et al., QALYs and Mental Health Care, 32 Soc. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC
EPIDEMIOLOGY 68 (1997). On the use of non-QALY "quality of life" measures in evaluating
anxiety, see, e.g., Mauro Mendlowicz & Murray B. Stein, Quality of Life in Individuals ivith
Anxiety Disorders, 157 AM. J PSYCHIATRY 669 (2000). These alternative measures, typically,
have multiple noncomparable subscales and do not provide a single overall number measuring
the impact of a health state on well-being.
179. See, e.g., Tolley et al., supra note 67, at 327-29.
180. On the QALY-to-dollars conversion issue, see Richard A. Hirth et al., Willingness to
Pay for a Quality-Adjusted Life Year: In Search of a Standard, 20 MED. DECISION MAKING 332
(2000). For a comparison of QALYs and WTP more generally, see James K. Hammitt, QALYs
Versus WTP, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 985 (2002); Patrick Hofstetter & James K. Hammitt, Human
Health Metrics for Environmental Decision Support Tools: Lessons from Health Economics and
Decision Analysis (EPA Office of Research and Development, 2001).
181. See Johnson, supra note 67 (correlating QALY and WTP values for short-term health
conditions).
182. See Tolley et al., supra note 67, at 328-29 (converting QALY values to dollar values
using a dollar value of a life year derived from the value of statistical life).
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In the case of anxiety, an indirect measure of WTP/WTA, generated via QALYs, would be particularly useful given the paucity of
direct contingent-valuation studies. Indirect measures, here and elsewhere, also have an epistemic role: they help test the validity of direct
measures.
How, then, should a QALY interview for valuing anxiety be
structured? Here, as in the contingent-valuation context, the "fear
state" being measured might be just an experiential state, or an experiential state plus its causal and constitutive consequences; and the
optimal emotional condition for the respondent, be it calm or fearful,
is the condition implied by the idealized perspective that defines objective welfare goods. What needs further discussion is the nature of
the QALY scale.
Scholarship on QALYs sometimes conceptualizes the QALY
scale as a health scale, not a welfare scale." 3 On this view, the numbers assigned to states track their goodness qua health, not qua wellbeing. Value is a generic concept, subsuming both welfare-value and
nonwelfarist values (for example, aesthetic value).14 Perhaps one of
the nonwelfarist values there subsumed is health-value. If so, a nonwelfarist QALY scale is a meaningful scale; but, even so, measurements on this kind of scale cannot serve as inputs into a welfarist
policy-analytic tool such as CBA.
A more subtle problem in using QALY measures to derive
WTPIWTA arises when the QALY scale is understood as a welfare
scale, but the range of the scale is truncated. To see this problem,
consider the Health Utilities Index ("HUI")-one of the leading
"health classification" methodologies used by QALY scholars.8 5
These methodologies characterize health states in a systematic way,
by reducing them to packages of attributes; the packages of attributes
are then placed by respondents on the 0-1 QALY scale, with 0 measuring death and I the best package. 8 6 In the case of the HUI system,
183. See Dolan, supra note 176, at 1727-29 (contrasting "welfarist" and "extrawclfarist"
conceptions of QALYs).
184. See L. W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS 20-25 (1996).
185. See Bell et al., supra note 177, at 291 (finding that the Rosser Index, Quality of WellBeing scale, and Health Utilities Index are the most frequently used health state classification
systems in QALY research); David H. Feeny et al., Health Utilities Index, in QUALITY OF LIFE
AND PHARMACOECONOMICS IN CLINICAL TRIALS, supra note 175, at 239 (describing HUI
system).
186. See, e.g., Dolan, supra note 176, at 1731-32, 1744-45 (discussing these classification
systems); QUALITY OF LIFE AND PHARMACOECONOMICS IN CLINICAL TRIALS, supra note 175,
at 161-362 (describing specific systems in detail).
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there are seven attributes: sensation, mobility, emotion, cognition,
self-care, pain, and fertility. Each of the seven attributes has four or
five levels. 18 7 For examples, the "sensation" attribute divides into the
following four levels:
HUI Health Status Classification System
Attribute
Sensation

Description
Level I
Able to see, hear and speak normally for age
I
Requires equipment to see or hear or speak
2
Sees, hears, or speaks with limitations even
3
with equipment
Blind, deaf or mute
4

Similarly, the "emotion" attribute divides into the following five
levels:
Attribute
Emotion

Level
1
2
3
4
5

Description
Generally happy and free from worry
Occasionally fretful, angry, irritable, anxious,
depressed, or suffering night terrors
Often fretful, angry, irritable, anxious, etc.
Almost always fretful, angry, irritable, anxious,
depressed
Extremely fretful, angry, irritable, or depressed usually requiring hospitalization or
psychiatric institutional care

The very best state in the HUI system is a state where the subject
is at the best level with respect to all seven attributes. He is able to
see, hear, and speak normally for his age (sensation); able to walk,
bend, lift, jump and run normally for his age (mobility); generally
happy and free from worry (emotion); learns and remembers schoolwork normally for his age (cognition); eats, bathes, dresses, and uses
the toilet normally for his age (self-care); is free of pain and discomfort (pain); and is able to have children with a fertile spouse (fertility).
The HUI system seems to be a promising tool for measuring
anxiety on a QALY scale and thereby indirectly deriving WTP/WTA
187. See Fccny et al., supra note 185, at 240-43. The system I am describing here is the HUI
Mark 11 system, which explicitly employs anxiety to differentiate levels within the "emotion"
attribute, by contrast with the more recent HUI Mark III system, which does not. See id.
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for anxiety. Emotion is one of the system's seven attributes; and the
levels within this attribute focus (inter alia) on anxiety. The problem
is that the seven attributes of the HUI system collectively comprise
only some of the dimensions of objective welfare: the physical and
emotional dimensions, not the social, intellectual, practical-reason,
political, or recreational dimensions described by Nussbaum in her
full list of human goods.1 88 This means that the very best state-the
state given a QALY value of 1-need not be the very best state for
human well-being. A 0-1 move on the QALY scale (as per the HUIsystem) means a move from death to a state where the subject has the
very best physical and emotional attributes, plus some package of
social, intellectual, practical-reason, political, and recreational characteristics that may be far from perfect. Relatedly, how a given move on
the QALY scale (as per the HUI-system) translates into a true interpersonal utility measure, or a dollar measure that roughly approximates a true interpersonal utility measure, will vary tremendously
depending on what background set of non-health and non-emotional
characteristics are ascribed to the subject.
Imagine, at one extreme, a subject who has no friends, no recreations, no community involvement, no intellectual engagements, and
no ongoing goals. Imagine, at the other extreme, a subject who has an
active social, professional, and intellectual life. Consider, now, respondents who are asked to attach a QALY value to fear using the
HUI classification system. At one extreme, respondents might imagine the first subject, assign I to his state when he is perfectly healthy
and (somehow) happy, 0 to his death, and place his fear on a 0-1
scale. At another extreme, respondents might imagine the second
subject, assign 1 to her state when she is perfectly healthy and happy,
0 to her death, and place her fear state on a 0-1 scale. Quite plausibly,
respondents might assign a much higher QALY cost to fear for the
first subject than for the second-not because fear has a greater interpersonal welfare impact in the first case, but rather because the
first subject's life is so impoverished that experiential or hedonic
qualities are (proportionally) more important in it.189
188. As the creators of the HUI system explain: "This systeml adoptis] a relatively more
narrow 'within the skin' approach to health status that focuses on physical and emotional dimensions of health status and excludes social interaction because it takes place 'outside the
skin."' Feeny et al., supra note 185, at 240.
189. The problem does not disappear if 0 is assigned to the worst physical and emotional
state (the state where the subject is at the lowest level with respect to all seven HUI attributes)
rather than to death, since the welfare goodness of a given package of emotional and physical
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The issue here, it should be stressed, is not whether the state beon a QALY scale is fear itself, or fear packaged with
measured
ing
changes along the nonemotional dimensions of welfare. We can come
up with a QALY cost for being afraid, as opposed to being calm,
holding everything else constant. We can also come up with a QALY
cost for being afraid plus suffering losses with respect to the nonemotional dimensions of welfare, as compared to being calm and not suffering those losses. Which kind of measurement, translated into
dollars, is best for CBA depends on standardization and deliberationcost considerations that I have already discussed. My criticism of the
HUI variant of the QALY scale, and similarly truncated variants,
concerns not what these scales are used to measure, but how they are
calibrated.The scales should be calibrated, as far as possible, to match
an interpersonal welfare scale. Equal units assigned to different subjects should represent, as far as possible, equal changes with respect
to overall well-being.
All the major health classification systems currently used to gen9
erate QALYs suffer from the same defects as the HUI system.
QALY measures of anxiety generated using these systems, or otherwise derived from a truncated scale whose intervals are calibrated by
varying some (not all) of the dimensions of welfare, are suspect for
CBA purposes. To give one prominent example: Kaplan and coworkers, based on a large general population survey, ascribe a QALY loss
of -0.257 to "[e]xcessive worry or anxiety."1 91 In other words, a day in
which the subject is calm and perfectly healthy has a QALY value of
1; a day in which he suffers "excessive worry or anxiety," but is otherwise perfectly healthy, has a QALY value of 0.743. This implies a
dollar value for a fear-day that, intuitively, is high. George Tolley, in
his comprehensive, "state-of-the-art" estimates of WTP/WTA for
health conditions, used low, medium, and high estimates of $70,000,
$120,000, and $175,000 per life year to convert some of Kaplan's
QALY numbers (not for anxiety but for other morbidities) into
attributes, as compared to the 0 and 1 states, will still depend upon the background professional,
intellectual, social, and other characteristics of the subject.
190. See MCCULLOCH, supra note 176, at 26-31 (describing the Rosser-Kind system); Kind,
supra note 175, at 191-201 (describing the EuroQoL system); Harri Sintonen, The 15D Instrument of Health-Related Quality of Life: Properties and Applications, 33 ANNALS MED. 328
(2001). The HUI system has already been described, and the Quality of Well-Being system is
described below.
191. Robert M. Kaplan & John P. Anderson. The General Health Policy Model An Integrated Approach, in QUALtTY OF LIFE AND PHARMACOECONOMICS IN CLINICAL TRIALS,
supra note 175, at 309, 316.
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WTP/WTA. 92 These conversion factors, applied to a QALY value for
anxiety of 0.743, imply a cost per fear-day (subsuming only the intrinsic cost of fear) ranging from $49 to $123. The FDA's conversion factor of $373,000 implies a cost per fear-day of $262. Compare these
estimates with the generally lower WTP/WTA estimates for light
morbidity conditions that have been directly elicited using contingent
valuation.
WTP To Avoid a Single Day of "Light" Health Conditions193
Angina
Angina (mild)
Angina (severe)
Cannot breathe deeply
Chest tightness
Cough
Cough/Sneeze (mild)
Cough/Sneeze (severe)
Drowsiness
Eye irritation
Head congestion (mild)
Head congestion (severe)
Headache
Nausea
Pain on deep inspiration
Runny nose
Shortness of breath
Shortness of breath (mild)
Shortness of breath (severe)
Sinus congestion
Throat congestion

131
88
165
19
26
25
12
33
43
29
20
47
25
69
35
13
9
35
70
33
31

192. See Tolley et al., supra note 67, at 329-36.
193. These are taken from Johnson, supra note 67, at 650-51. The values here are based on
contingent-valuation surveys asking for WTP to avoid a single day of the condition. Johnson
also reports WTP responses to avoid multiple days of various conditions. The one-day estimates
derived from these valuations are not included here. (They are generally lower than the directly
elicited one-day values.) Where Johnson reports more than one study of a given condition, I
have averaged the WTP values.
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Kaplan's QALY estimate of anxiety is problematic for CBA
purposes because it was derived using his truncated "Quality of WellBeing" scale. 194 Health states were classified with respect to the subject's mobility, physical ability, ability to engage in social activity, and
negative experiences (pain, fatigue, cognitive difficulties, anxiety).
95
Respondents were asked to measure the desirability of different
concatenations of these attributes on a 0-1 scale, with 0 meaning
death and I a "perfect" state in which the subject is fully mobile, capable of engaging in the full range of ordinary physical and social
activities, and free of any of the hedonic detriments of disease. One
important question about Kaplan's survey is whether respondents
understood that they were supposed to evaluate the welfare importance of these states rather than its "healthiness" in some nonwelfarist sense. Even if they did understand that, they might have been
confused by the evaluative task: What does it mean to assess the welfare-desirability of a state whose welfare-relevant features have been
incompletely described? The only way to do that coherently (as already suggested) is to fill in the description by ascribing background
nonhealth characteristics, or lotteries over such characteristics, to the
subject. 196 If that is what respondents to the Kaplan survey did, what
was the source of those background characteristics? Were respondents to Kaplan's survey imagining, as the top point on the 0-1 scale,
a mobile, physically and socially capable, and pain and anxiety-free
subject who had their (the respondents') affiliational, recreational,
professional, intellectual, and income characteristics? A subject with
194. See Kaplan & Anderson, supra note 191; see also Robert M. Kaplan et al., Health
Status: Types of Validity and the Index of Well-Being, 11 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 478 (1976);
Robert M. Kaplan & James W. Bush, Health-Related Quality of Life Measurement for Evaluation Research and Policy Analysis, 1 HEALTH PSYCH. 61 (1982); Robert M. Kaplan & John P.
Anderson, A General Health Policy Model: Update and Applications, 23 HEALTH SERVICES
RES. 203 (1988).
195. 1 have not located the questionnaire that Kaplan employed in his research. In a recent
article on the Quality of Well-Being system, he characterizes the survey as asking respondents
to evaluate the "desirability" of health conditions. Kaplan & Anderson, supra note 191, at 316.
196. If the effect of health on a subject's welfare were (somehow!) independent of the subject's nonhealth characteristics, then a respondent to Kaplan's survey could coherently answer it
without ascribing nonhealth characteristics to the subject. Imagine that the welfare measure of a
subject's overall state can be decomposed into f(D,) + f2(D2) +. •. + f,(D.), where the values for
the different dimensions range from 0 to 1, and where health is one of these independent dimensions. Then the number on a 0-1 scale assigned to a given health state could represent its
value on the health dimension, which does not depend on where the subject is located with
respect to the other D, But of course health is not independent of nonhealth characteristics in
this sense. If the subject is dead, or incapacitated, or in crippling pain, that limits his possible
professional, intellectual, social, and other non-health attainments, or at the very least changes
their welfare-significance for him.
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ideal such characteristics? A subject with average such characteristics? Even if we were sure that respondents to the Kaplan survey
were engaged in welfarist rather than extrawelfarist valuation, and
did so in a coherent way, a conversion factor for deriving monetary
amounts from their expressed OALY measures would need (somehow) to take account of the problem of background characteristics. A
QALY estimate of -0.257 for anxiety, valued on a scale where death is
0 and 1 is good health but a pretty poor life overall, should hardly be
converted into dollar inputs to CBA at the very same rate as a QALY
estimate of -0.257 on a scale where death is 0 and 1 represents a terrifically high level of welfare.
The solution to these difficulties, I suggest, is to measure
fear/anxiety (and health states more generally) on an inclusive QALY
scale-one that takes account of a wider range of life's goods, and
therefore better approximates a true interpersonal welfare scale.
Were there deliberation-cost disadvantages to using an inclusive
scale, a truncated scale might on balance be justified-but it is hard to
see what the deliberation-cost disadvantages would be. Truncated
scales already involve interview costs and necessitate much conceptual effort on the part of respondents. As it turns out, the World
Health Organization is currently developing an inclusive "quality of
life" index that might be employed to ground QALY ascriptions. 97
The current version of this index, known as the WHOQOL-100, employs twenty-four attributes ("facets"), grouped into six domainsphysical, psychological, "independence," social, environmental, and
spiritual-to characterize subjects' states. The first three domains
cover the territory of existing health classification systems, but also
include a self-esteem attribute, a body-image attribute, and an attribute for positive as well as negative feelings. The last three domains
cover much of what is subsumed by Nussbaum's list of objective
goods but excluded by traditional QALY indices. The "social" domain asks about the quality of the subject's personal relationships,
social support, and sex life. The "environment" domain covers
197. See Amy E. Bonomi et al., Validation of the United States' Version of the World Health
OrganizationQuality of Life (WHOQOL) Instrument, 53 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 1 (2000);
Silvija Szabo, The World Health Organization Qualit , of Life (WHOQOL) Assessment Instrument. in QUALITY OF LIFE AND PHARMACOECONOMICS IN CLINICAL TRIALS, supra note 175,
at 355; The WHOQOL Group, The World Health Organization Quality of Life Assessment
(WHOQOL): Development and General Psychometric Properties, 46 Soc. SCI. MED. 1569
(1998); The WHOQOL Group. The World Health Organization Quality of Life Assessment
(WHOQOL): Position Paper from the World Health Organization, 41 SOC. SCI. MED. 1403
(1995).
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personal security, housing quality, wealth, access to information and
education, access to social services, recreational activities, pollution,
and transport. The spiritual domain asks about the perceived meaningfulness of the subject's life.
A QALY estimate of fear or anxiety derived from a large-scale
survey of calm (not fearful) individuals using an inclusive health-state
classification system such as the WHOQOL-100 would be an excellent basis for a monetary valuation of these mental states. Alas, I have
found no such estimate in the published literature.
CONCLUSION

Fear is a welfare setback and thus, it would seem, should be
counted as a cost for CBA purposes. In this Article, I have argued
that agencies should indeed engage in fear assessment; they should
quantify and monetize the effects of their choices on overall fear and
anxiety, where agencies are otherwise engaged in CBA and where ex
ante the deliberation costs of fear assessment appear to be warranted.
The Article has rebutted various objections to fear assessment, other
than the deliberation-cost worry: irrational as well as rational fears
are real harms for those who experience them; fear can be quantified;
worries about uncertainty and causality reduce to deliberation costs;
the possibility of reducing fear through information rather than prescription means that agencies should look at a wider range of policy
options, not that they should evaluate options without considering
fear costs; the concern that the very practice of fear assessment will,
on balance, increase fear by creating stronger incentives for fear entrepreneurs seems overblown; and fear is a welfare setback, whether
or not it flows from political views. Further, I have argued that fear
assessment should take an "unbundled" rather than "bundled" form,
at least if the current VOSL method for pricing risk is retained; the
notion of incorporating both fear and risk costs in "tailored" VOSLs
rests on two implausible assumptions, namely a coincidence between
actual and perceived risk and a linear correlation between perceived
risk and fear. I have proposed one concrete methodology for "unbundled" fear assessment: predicting changes in aggregate fear-days
resulting from regulatory interventions, and pricing each fear-day at a
standard price. Finally, I have tried to show that contingent-valuation
rather than revealed-preference techniques are best suited to reveal
the cost-in my lingo, the "welfare equivalent"-for a fear state; that
the instrumental as well as intrinsic costs of fear may need to be
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accounted for; that, optimally, the respondents to contingentvaluation interviews are calm, not fearful; and that QALY measures
of fear may be a useful way to generate estimates of welfare equivalents, but only if the QALY scale is understood as a welfare scale and
is calibrated in an inclusive way.

